Sandy takes a comprehensive look at Bavasi's career, starting from Day One, and finds some interesting syndromes.

Sandy is just about the only person on the Seattle 'net who brings objectivity.  He has no positions that he's married to, no predictions to justify, no organizations to audition for.  What he does have is a familiarity with the way baseball is done right — in Atlanta — and a fresh perspective.

We have another article from Sandy in our hip pocket, too.  Thanks amigo! - Dr D

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Premise: Bavasi was a terrible judge of talent, and therefore was the right man to fire. This is a view that is at this point generally accepted as truth by many in the blog-o-sphere. Why I disagree.

=== 2003 ===

What Bavasi inherited: Wilson, Olerud, Boone, Ichiro, Edgar, Winn, C.Guillen, Cirillo, Garcia, Moyer, Franklin, Meche, Pineiro

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=== 2004 ===

2004 CHOICES: Traded Cirillo and C. Guillen - everybody netted was useless. Let Cameron walk away.

Added: Spiezio, Aurilia, Ibanez

Getting nothing for Cirillo is hardly a surprise. Giving away Guillen was definitely a bad move in hindsight (but was by most accounts a Committee move dictated to Bavasi in view of Guillen's drinking and influence on Freddy - DrD). But, Guillen was already 27 in 2003, and had just managed to squeak out a 104 OPS+ (.753 raw OPS), for a career best season. He had also seemed defensively deficient compared to the 35-year-old Rey Sanchez. He had also started only 109 games. Worries about health and defense make a "sell high" stance not completely unreasonable. This is especially attractive when you've got a top-flight spec in Jose Lopez coming up at short. Guillen's "cheap" seasons were over, and the club was CLEARLY in a rebuilding mode. Going with the 20-year-old phenom rather than the 27-year-old who had never really put it all together wasn't a bad move.

Guillen exploding immediately after getting to Detroit, (while the farm implements are worthless), could call into question Bavasi's talent assessment, (or that of the organization). But, there is ZERO evidence to suggest that Guillen would've had the explosion that he had in Detroit if he had stayed in Seattle (LOL, how true - Dr D). Detroit managed to FIX or add SOMETHING to Guillen to morph him from a .730 hitter into an .830 hitter. He had NEVER indicated he might become a .500 slugger prior to reaching Detroit.

Aside from Guillen, the stop-gap moves for 2004 were the 1-year pick-ups of Speizio and Aurillia. The only long-term acquistion - Ibanez.

But, here's the squeeze that Bavasi walked into. He had an entire roster of geezers that were beyond the point of trading for value - AND the club had managed 93 wins. The SPECIFIC moves that he made for 2003 to 2004? Replace OPS+ 51 (Cirillo) and OPS+104 (Guillen) and OPS+ 108 (Cameron) with OPS+ 67 (Spezio) and OPS+ 70 (Aurillia) and OPS+ 116 (Ibanez).

Two of these guys were CLEARLY place-holders. Ibanez the only one sticking around for more than a year. Ibanez was picked up 12 days after Bavasi was hired, and has had 4 outstanding seasons, and is currently having a decent 5th one. The collapse had basically nothing to do with Bavasi's talent assessment. The collapse was a result of the geriatric roster he interited.

Two out of three acquisitions in 2004 out-performed the guys they replaced. A really smart and gutsy GM would've looked at the 2003 roster, realized that it was time to blow things up, and done a complete fire sale. But, with the run that the Mariners were on, how would a new GM *SELL* that idea to anyone?

One thing to consider in this - the run split in 2003 was 795-637. The pitching staff was retained in nearly identical form. The run split for 2004 was 698-823. The offense lost 97 runs. But the defense lost 186. The DEFENSE plunged twice as far as the offense, DESPITE BEING THE NEARLY IDENTICAL staff. Hey - go ahead and blame Bavasi for that, if you wish - but whatever explanation you give, it **CANNOT POSSIBLY** be talent assessment. Because it wasn't the talent he assessed. It was the talent he inherited.

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=== 2005 ===

The 2004 collapse was a blessing for Bavasi, in that it handed him the "permission" to actually do what should have been started at least two years prior - which is start rebuilding (as Inside Pitch noted at the time, the only way that Bavasi was ever going to get to do it his way, was if the M's started losing - Dr D).

He replaces Olerud (90) and Spezio (67) with Sexson (144) and Beltre (93).

The rebuild actually began in mid-2004, when he traded Garcia for Olivo, Reed and Morse. Now, *ALL THREE* of those specs have had major league experience. All three could be considered AAAA talent, as well. But, Garcia was not AROD. And Reed was considered a top 25 blue chip spec by pretty much every spec watching org on the planet. Olivo, after failing with Seattle managed to have a good (.727) and bad (.667) season with Florida, before this year - when at age 29, he is posting a .789 OPS with KC.  Reed is actually hitting well enough this season that people are actually discussing the possibility that he might actually stick.  (The Reed-Olivo trade had Seattle pleasantly stunned at the time - Dr D.)

In that first year, Sexson and Beltre were both significant upgrades in their positions. On the pitching side, the trade of Garcia left an open slot in the rotation. Aaron Sele was the pickup. Again, this was stop-gap. It was a 1-year deal for a place-holder, whose purpose was to fill a hole until Felix was ready. Felix arrived in August.

As a side note, though Sele was legitimately bad in 2005 with Seattle, he went on to post a 99 OPS+ the following season with the Dodgers. In an odd happenstance, Sele posted the IDENTICAL WHIP with Anaheim in 2004 that he did with Seattle in 2005 - though his ERA ballooned by a half run. Then again, he only cost the team 700k.

Run split for 2004: 698-823

Run split for 2005: 699-751.

Player change comps:

Wilson (64) to Olivo (20) -

Yorvit (71) Olerud (90) to Sexson (144)

Spiezio (67) to Beltre (93)

Aurilia (70) to YuBet (80)

R. Winn (103) to Reed (84)

Garcia (142) to Sele (74)/Felix (157)

Winn was traded for Yorvit and Foppert during the season. NOTE: FOPPERT WAS A TOP 5 SPEC IN 2003! If Bavasi's judgement was bad, so was every scout and pundit on the planet.

But, the good news was the major move toward youth. Reed, YuBet, Beltre, Olivo — basically a major push on the offensive side to get younger. The contracts for Sexson and Beltre were high - but these were "finished" products, where the production was generally easier to predict. The youth movement, however, carries inherent risk. Winn continues to be a .770 OPS OF.

At this point, the offense is becoming Bavasi's club. But the pitching staff is still 80% inherited.

=== 2006 ===

Run split for 2003: 795-637

Run split for 2004: 698-823

Run split for 2005: 699-751

Run split for 2006: 756-792

With repeated failures to land a decent catcher, the club goes and gets Johjima from Japan. This was a BRILLIANT acquisition, especially given the horrid catcher results thus far in the Bavasi reign.

Yorvit (71) to Johjima (103)

Boone (85) to Lopez (89)

Winn (103) to Everett (72)

Franklin (82) to Washburn (95)

Everett was another 1-year stop-gap, basically intended to be a placeholder for heir apparent Chris Snelling, or perhaps Adam Jones or Wlad.

He finally made his FIRST move to try and improve the pitching. It is important to understand that he INHERITED Meche and Pineiro, who were SUPPOSED to develop into something. He didn't draft or promote them. He also inherited Moyer and Felix.

But, none of the young starters were developing. Pineiro regressed badly in 2006 and Meche reached age 27 STILL unable to break the 100 ERA+ barrier. After his 1.34 WHIP in 2003, he had posted WHIPs of 1.45, 1.57 and 1.43. That's not about talent assessment. It's about coaching and defense.

The 2006 club was CLOSE to Bavasi's team on the offensive side. But, consider that you're trying to rebuild nearly from scratch. The TRICK is in getting enough different parts to come together at the right time.

The pitching was mostly young, (Moyer the obvious exception), so you flip the offense first, and try and shore up the farm. Then, *BECAUSE* the youth hasn't developed on the pitching side, you have no choice but to go shopping for help.

In the end, 2006 saw an offense back to the 2003 level.

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=== 2007 ===

Run split for 2003: 795-637

Run split for 2004: 698-823

Run split for 2005: 699-751

Run split for 2006: 756-792

Run split for 2007: 794-813

Everett (72) to Vidro (109)

Reed (65) to Guillen (116)

Meche (99) to Batista (101)

Moyer (101) to Weaver (70)

Pineiro (70) to HoRam (61)

Vidro WAS a commitment, and as such, completed the Bavasi offensive scheme - and that got Seattle almost exactly back to where they were in 2003.

The pitching choices for 2007 were primarily thrust upon him, and there is no denying the results were horrid in 2 or 3 cases. The only case where the result was NOT horrid, was for the one guy that actually signed for more than one year. Bavasi WANTED an ace to pair with Felix, but couldn't snag either Zito or Schmidt, (which is a plus with hindsight).

But, *at the end of 2007* - let's review the actual success/failure rate of players Bavasi signed for MORE than 1 year.

Ibanez - unqualified success.

Johjima - unqualified success.

Beltre - slow start, but a success for the next 2 seasons.

Sexson - 2 great seasons, then a collapse.

Vidro — solid first season

Washburn - 2 decent seasons

Batista — 1 decent season

YuBet - decent, if unspectacular performance - first actual Bavasi spec to become a regular.

The rest of the team were inherited, including the prospects. Looking solely at the players Bavasi acquired for the long term, the only major downside players AT THAT POINT had been Beltre's first season, (which he had erased from most people's memories with his subsequent improvement), and Sexson's 2007 debacle. If you add up "acceptable" and "unacceptable" seasons for all of the MULTI-YEAR Bavasi signings, then prior to 2008, he actually comes out with a significantly positive result score.

However, if you were to look at all of his SINGLE-SEASON acquisitions, his results have been horrendous.

If you look at the results of prospects acquired, the results have been poor to dreadful.

Then again, he actually didn't have much to trade away, and didn't actually acquire many specs. The top two specs acquired were Reed (at top 25 spec) and Foppert (a top 5 spec). Garcia's performance has been spotty since departure, too.

Another thing he initially inherited was the Manager, Bob Melvin, who plunged from 93 wins to 63 wins with basically the same roster. Bavasi's (I believe Lincoln's and Armstrong's - Dr D) managerial choice was Hargrove, who saw his winning percentage climb every season he was at the helm. I know he wasn't popular with many fans - but coming on the heels of Melvin's .389, his W% went .426, .481, .577. And Bavasi didn't choose to fire him. This is one where the move came out of the blue.

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=== 2008 === 

This is where I diverge from the masses on the analysis of why the 2008 collapse came.

Mac inherited a winning team, which ALREADY believed in itself. For most of the rest of 2007, the team was largely on auto-pilot. But, when they faltered, he couldn't right them. Hargrove 45-33; MacLaren 43-41.

Of course, sometimes circumstances beyond a manager's control can skew results. Felix missed 4 starts, (oh, wait - those were under Hargrove). Oh, and Sexson missed almost an entire month, (but wait - Broussard actually played BETTER than Sexson did all year). MacLaren actually even benefitted from the one really good month that Weaver posted.

I look at 2007 and I see the replacement manager getting practically every break in the world IN HIS DIRECTION, but dropping 10 games in win/loss differential.

In point of fact, the team climbed to 20 games over .500 early in Macs stint, (which I view as the team just basically continuing to ride the momentum Hargrove had supplied), and then lost those gains by the end of the year.

Prior to 2008, the production from the multi-year signings under Bavasi had been almost universally acceptable. One bad season for Beltre and one bad season for Sexson. But, that production went completely in the toilet for THE ENTIRE TEAM in 2008.

Okay, with Sexson I can buy the argument that talent assessment could say he's got a skill set that doesn't age well, so perhaps the decline was predictable. (This, of course, gets back to my feeling that AGE management is the organizations achilles heel). But, Delgado, who was the other highly coveted FA at the time has had a nearly identical swoon.

Those WERE the choices he had at the time. You can only make choices among available resources. His farm did NOT have a Pujols, (or even a Teixeira), as the sad fate of Chris Snelling has demonstrated.

But how can "talent assessment" be blamed for an offense that was solid in 2007 be the cause of the same squad collapsing in 2008? From my perspective, the one clear and present variable that changed was the manager.

If you want to blame Bavasi for sticking by his Manager - (which I do) - that makes sense (managerial changes are made by the Committee in Seattle, which is not unusual around baseball - Dr D).

You inherit a club that is winning and thriving and everyone is producing at or above expectation, (which was true for just about every hitter except Sexson in 2007), and they are suddenly ALL slumping. That's a major problem. But it's got nothing to do with talent assessment.

I was actually a fan of the Wilkerson signing. I saw it as very similar to Guillen, except with a different style of hitter. But, I said *BEFORE* he played a day that Wilkerson was a hitter who NEEDED to play every day and get comfortable in order to thrive. He also is not a typical lefty who cannot handle lefties - so trying a standard platoon was going to be a real big mistake. Well, MacLaren doesn't give him time to get comfortable AND starts platooning him AND he gets a minor injury keeping his playing time down. So, he's DFAed.

Toronto picks him up - and for his first 10 games he stinks, (which confirms everyone else's opinion of the guy). I continue to say, he is NOT done. He has just been mis-used. Well, as of 6/19, what has Wilkerson done in the last 28 days, (having gotten over his 10 day layoff and initial work back into things)? 23 games - 20-started; 84-PA; 72-AB; 22-H; 10-R; 5-2B; 2-HR; 9-BB; 24-K; 12-RBI; Total line of: .306/.373/.458 - for an .832 OPS. Truthfully, that's slightly above his head. He's not a "great" hitter, but he was cheap, and when used properly continues to show the ability to post .775-ish numbers.

The thing to consider here is that talent under-performing WITH SEATTLE is not necessarily about the TALENT of those players.

Pineiro had a good start to his career with Seattle, and then saw his production plunge. After posting 1.48 and 1.65 WHIPs, he got the boot. With St. Louis, he's been consistently below 1.30, (where he BEGAN his career).

Gil Meche saw his WHIP jump from 1.34 early to 1.45 to 1.57 back to 1.43 before he walked. With KC, that WHIP comes in at 1.29 and 1.37 this season. The problem is not talent ASSESSMENT. The problem is (based on evidence) almost certainly tied more to player development and utilization.

If one wants to blame the complete collapse of the Seattle defensive production on Bavasi, I'll listen. Because the defense got CONSISTENTLY worse under Bavasi. Whereas, the offense had shown gradual improvement prior to 2008.

There have been screams that Bavasi was the worst GM of ALL TIME. Well, what deal did he sign that has shown to be as unquestionablly dreadful as Oakland's acquisition of Jason Kendall? Today, there are screams, (legitimate ones) about the idiocy of signing Johjima for 3 years at $8 per year. Kendall got $10, $11 and $13 million from Oakland - and provided OPS+ figures of 79, 88 and 48 (before they managed to dump him on the Cubs).

Oakland is lauded for landing Thomas - but what about Piazza? They paid Piazza $8.5 to post half a season of 96 OPS+ production. Compare the Wilkerson pickup to the Oakland Shannon Stewart pickup. Both were for 1 year. Both were for about a million bucks. Stewart had posted 87 and 88 OPS+ figures the previous two seasons and was 33 upon arriving in Oakland. Wilkerson was younger, and had gone 86 and 104 the two years before arriving. They had IDENTIAL 106 OPS+ figures for their careers.

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From my perspective, the knock on Bavasi is primarily an emotional reaction to a series of events which were "largely", (but not completely), out of his control. Bavasi is blamed (emotionally) for the collapse of 2004. But NOTHING that Bavasi did caused that team to collapse. It was poised to implode before Bavasi was ever hired.

But the collapse becomes the first impression, and everything after that is viewed through that prism of failure.

The 2008 collapse is orchestrated by a roster selected predominantly by Bavasi. So, it makes sense to blame Bavasi. But, if one actually looks at the sequence of events and pays attention to the sequence of what happened - here is the quick and dirty of 2008 (until Bavasi's ouster).

1) Club is picked to compete for Western title or wild card.

2) Anaheim gets hit by injuries making optimistic fans even more giddy.

3) Club begins season playing .500 ball.

Note that the COLLAPSE did *NOT* occur during April. APRIL: 13-15; 245-IP; 4.12-ERA; 247-Hits; 102-BB; 172-K; 119-R; 23-HR (pitching) APRIL: .258/.321/.396/.717 - .273-BABIP; 1048-PA; 24-HR; 127-R; 92-BB; 130-K (hitting)

4) So, on April 26th, the club is 12-13, 3 games back. They give Johjima a 3-year extension worth $24 million. He is, at that point in time, the WORST performing player on the club - bar none. As of April 30th, the club is 13-15, 4.5 games back. The club DFAs Norton and Wilkerson.

Here's the thing, you've got a struggling club, and in 4 days, you REWARD the worst player on the team, and tell your ONLY productive bat off the bench to take a hike. You boot your million dollar OF pickup, (who has only played about 1/2 time due to injury and platoon). While the decision may have been made earlier, it just so happens that the Wilkerson canning is announced immediately after he's had a 3 for 3 day, raising his OBP to .348.

For me, this is a trifecta of moronic moves. You send a double message — that incompetence will be rewarded handsomely, and performance will be punished severely.

5) So, AFTER these moves, what happens? MAY: 8-20; 247-IP; 5.39-ERA; 280-Hits; 107-BB; 185-K; 164-R; 28-HR (pitching) — 11.5 games back MAY: .240/.292/.367/.660 - .267-BABIP; 1039-PA; 23-HR; 99-R; 66-BB; 163-K; (hitting)

The total team collapse can be traced almost to the minute that Johjima was extended - followed by the ousters of Norton and Wilkerson. While much rejoicing ensued with the promotions of Wlad and Clement to the majors, both would perform even worse than their predecessors during their first month in the bigs. By June 16th, (Bavasi's final day), the club was 24-46, having gone 3-11 in June, 17.5 games back.

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Can Bavasi be blamed for the 2008 woes? Yes. But it is NOT about talent assessment. It is about talent MANAGEMENT. The club made moves that could not have been more directly harmful to building a winning attitude if they had actually been designed to do so. Reward failure. Axe your best bench player. Then come out and laud your manager and blame the players.

When April ended, the team was -8 in run differential. The run differential in May was -65. If one wants to complain that the April team was only a .500 team, costing $117 million, that's a legitimate claim, backed up by data to a degree.

Just before the Johjima extension, I noted that the team was loaded with players that were under-performing and that an EXPLOSION could happen any day.

What actually happened was a series of moves that cannot be viewed as anything but a crushing psychological blow to the entire team. It never occured to me that a club would work almost methodically to destroy the morale of a team.

It makes me think of Major League, and some secret management conspiracy designed to force 100 losses so they can move the team.

My conclusion? Bavasi assembled enough TALENT that they had a legitimate shot at the playoffs. But, he then put a manager in charge whose only talent appears to have been the ability to get the least amount of production out of every player he was given. THEN Bavasi did everything in his power as GM to magnify his Manager's one apparent ability.

Did he deserve to be fired? Yes. But it wasn't due to talent assessment problems. The much, much, much larger problem was talent utilization and optimization. In that arena, Seattle has sunk to the bottom of baseball.

– Sandy Hemenway