BYE BYE BAVASI, BYE BYE - Sandy Hemenway
Sandy takes a comprehensive look at Bavasi's career, starting from Day One, and finds some interesting syndromes.
Sandy is just about the only person on the Seattle 'net who brings objectivity. He has no positions that he's married to, no predictions to justify, no organizations to audition for. What he does have is a familiarity with the way baseball is done right — in Atlanta — and a fresh perspective.
We have another article from Sandy in our hip pocket, too. Thanks amigo! - Dr D
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Premise: Bavasi was a terrible judge of talent, and therefore was the right man to fire. This is a view that is at this point generally accepted as truth by many in the blog-o-sphere. Why I disagree.
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=== 2003 ===
What Bavasi inherited: Wilson, Olerud, Boone, Ichiro, Edgar, Winn, C.Guillen, Cirillo, Garcia, Moyer, Franklin, Meche, Pineiro
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=== 2004 ===
2004 CHOICES: Traded Cirillo and C. Guillen - everybody netted was useless. Let Cameron walk away.
Added: Spiezio, Aurilia, Ibanez
Getting nothing for Cirillo is hardly a surprise. Giving away Guillen was definitely a bad move in hindsight (but was by most accounts a Committee move dictated to Bavasi in view of Guillen's drinking and influence on Freddy - DrD). But, Guillen was already 27 in 2003, and had just managed to squeak out a 104 OPS+ (.753 raw OPS), for a career best season. He had also seemed defensively deficient compared to the 35-year-old Rey Sanchez. He had also started only 109 games. Worries about health and defense make a "sell high" stance not completely unreasonable. This is especially attractive when you've got a top-flight spec in Jose Lopez coming up at short. Guillen's "cheap" seasons were over, and the club was CLEARLY in a rebuilding mode. Going with the 20-year-old phenom rather than the 27-year-old who had never really put it all together wasn't a bad move.
Guillen exploding immediately after getting to Detroit, (while the farm implements are worthless), could call into question Bavasi's talent assessment, (or that of the organization). But, there is ZERO evidence to suggest that Guillen would've had the explosion that he had in Detroit if he had stayed in Seattle (LOL, how true - Dr D). Detroit managed to FIX or add SOMETHING to Guillen to morph him from a .730 hitter into an .830 hitter. He had NEVER indicated he might become a .500 slugger prior to reaching Detroit.
Aside from Guillen, the stop-gap moves for 2004 were the 1-year pick-ups of Speizio and Aurillia. The only long-term acquistion - Ibanez.
But, here's the squeeze that Bavasi walked into. He had an entire roster of geezers that were beyond the point of trading for value - AND the club had managed 93 wins. The SPECIFIC moves that he made for 2003 to 2004? Replace OPS+ 51 (Cirillo) and OPS+104 (Guillen) and OPS+ 108 (Cameron) with OPS+ 67 (Spezio) and OPS+ 70 (Aurillia) and OPS+ 116 (Ibanez).
Two of these guys were CLEARLY place-holders. Ibanez the only one sticking around for more than a year. Ibanez was picked up 12 days after Bavasi was hired, and has had 4 outstanding seasons, and is currently having a decent 5th one. The collapse had basically nothing to do with Bavasi's talent assessment. The collapse was a result of the geriatric roster he interited.
Two out of three acquisitions in 2004 out-performed the guys they replaced. A really smart and gutsy GM would've looked at the 2003 roster, realized that it was time to blow things up, and done a complete fire sale. But, with the run that the Mariners were on, how would a new GM *SELL* that idea to anyone?
One thing to consider in this - the run split in 2003 was 795-637. The pitching staff was retained in nearly identical form. The run split for 2004 was 698-823. The offense lost 97 runs. But the defense lost 186. The DEFENSE plunged twice as far as the offense, DESPITE BEING THE NEARLY IDENTICAL staff. Hey - go ahead and blame Bavasi for that, if you wish - but whatever explanation you give, it **CANNOT POSSIBLY** be talent assessment. Because it wasn't the talent he assessed. It was the talent he inherited.
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=== 2005 ===
The 2004 collapse was a blessing for Bavasi, in that it handed him the "permission" to actually do what should have been started at least two years prior - which is start rebuilding (as Inside Pitch noted at the time, the only way that Bavasi was ever going to get to do it his way, was if the M's started losing - Dr D).
He replaces Olerud (90) and Spezio (67) with Sexson (144) and Beltre (93).
The rebuild actually began in mid-2004, when he traded Garcia for Olivo, Reed and Morse. Now, *ALL THREE* of those specs have had major league experience. All three could be considered AAAA talent, as well. But, Garcia was not AROD. And Reed was considered a top 25 blue chip spec by pretty much every spec watching org on the planet. Olivo, after failing with Seattle managed to have a good (.727) and bad (.667) season with Florida, before this year - when at age 29, he is posting a .789 OPS with KC. Reed is actually hitting well enough this season that people are actually discussing the possibility that he might actually stick. (The Reed-Olivo trade had Seattle pleasantly stunned at the time - Dr D.)
In that first year, Sexson and Beltre were both significant upgrades in their positions. On the pitching side, the trade of Garcia left an open slot in the rotation. Aaron Sele was the pickup. Again, this was stop-gap. It was a 1-year deal for a place-holder, whose purpose was to fill a hole until Felix was ready. Felix arrived in August.
As a side note, though Sele was legitimately bad in 2005 with Seattle, he went on to post a 99 OPS+ the following season with the Dodgers. In an odd happenstance, Sele posted the IDENTICAL WHIP with Anaheim in 2004 that he did with Seattle in 2005 - though his ERA ballooned by a half run. Then again, he only cost the team 700k.
Run split for 2004: 698-823
Run split for 2005: 699-751.
Player change comps:
Wilson (64) to Olivo (20) -
Yorvit (71) Olerud (90) to Sexson (144)
Spiezio (67) to Beltre (93)
Aurilia (70) to YuBet (80)
R. Winn (103) to Reed (84)
Garcia (142) to Sele (74)/Felix (157)
Winn was traded for Yorvit and Foppert during the season. NOTE: FOPPERT WAS A TOP 5 SPEC IN 2003! If Bavasi's judgement was bad, so was every scout and pundit on the planet.
But, the good news was the major move toward youth. Reed, YuBet, Beltre, Olivo — basically a major push on the offensive side to get younger. The contracts for Sexson and Beltre were high - but these were "finished" products, where the production was generally easier to predict. The youth movement, however, carries inherent risk. Winn continues to be a .770 OPS OF.
At this point, the offense is becoming Bavasi's club. But the pitching staff is still 80% inherited.
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=== 2006 ===
Run split for 2003: 795-637
Run split for 2004: 698-823
Run split for 2005: 699-751
Run split for 2006: 756-792
With repeated failures to land a decent catcher, the club goes and gets Johjima from Japan. This was a BRILLIANT acquisition, especially given the horrid catcher results thus far in the Bavasi reign.
Yorvit (71) to Johjima (103)
Boone (85) to Lopez (89)
Winn (103) to Everett (72)
Franklin (82) to Washburn (95)
Everett was another 1-year stop-gap, basically intended to be a placeholder for heir apparent Chris Snelling, or perhaps Adam Jones or Wlad.
He finally made his FIRST move to try and improve the pitching. It is important to understand that he INHERITED Meche and Pineiro, who were SUPPOSED to develop into something. He didn't draft or promote them. He also inherited Moyer and Felix.
But, none of the young starters were developing. Pineiro regressed badly in 2006 and Meche reached age 27 STILL unable to break the 100 ERA+ barrier. After his 1.34 WHIP in 2003, he had posted WHIPs of 1.45, 1.57 and 1.43. That's not about talent assessment. It's about coaching and defense.
The 2006 club was CLOSE to Bavasi's team on the offensive side. But, consider that you're trying to rebuild nearly from scratch. The TRICK is in getting enough different parts to come together at the right time.
The pitching was mostly young, (Moyer the obvious exception), so you flip the offense first, and try and shore up the farm. Then, *BECAUSE* the youth hasn't developed on the pitching side, you have no choice but to go shopping for help.
In the end, 2006 saw an offense back to the 2003 level.
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=== 2007 ===
Run split for 2003: 795-637
Run split for 2004: 698-823
Run split for 2005: 699-751
Run split for 2006: 756-792
Run split for 2007: 794-813
Everett (72) to Vidro (109)
Reed (65) to Guillen (116)
Meche (99) to Batista (101)
Moyer (101) to Weaver (70)
Pineiro (70) to HoRam (61)
Vidro WAS a commitment, and as such, completed the Bavasi offensive scheme - and that got Seattle almost exactly back to where they were in 2003.
The pitching choices for 2007 were primarily thrust upon him, and there is no denying the results were horrid in 2 or 3 cases. The only case where the result was NOT horrid, was for the one guy that actually signed for more than one year. Bavasi WANTED an ace to pair with Felix, but couldn't snag either Zito or Schmidt, (which is a plus with hindsight).
But, *at the end of 2007* - let's review the actual success/failure rate of players Bavasi signed for MORE than 1 year.
Ibanez - unqualified success.
Johjima - unqualified success.
Beltre - slow start, but a success for the next 2 seasons.
Sexson - 2 great seasons, then a collapse.
Vidro — solid first season
Washburn - 2 decent seasons
Batista — 1 decent season
YuBet - decent, if unspectacular performance - first actual Bavasi spec to become a regular.
The rest of the team were inherited, including the prospects. Looking solely at the players Bavasi acquired for the long term, the only major downside players AT THAT POINT had been Beltre's first season, (which he had erased from most people's memories with his subsequent improvement), and Sexson's 2007 debacle. If you add up "acceptable" and "unacceptable" seasons for all of the MULTI-YEAR Bavasi signings, then prior to 2008, he actually comes out with a significantly positive result score.
However, if you were to look at all of his SINGLE-SEASON acquisitions, his results have been horrendous.
If you look at the results of prospects acquired, the results have been poor to dreadful.
Then again, he actually didn't have much to trade away, and didn't actually acquire many specs. The top two specs acquired were Reed (at top 25 spec) and Foppert (a top 5 spec). Garcia's performance has been spotty since departure, too.
Another thing he initially inherited was the Manager, Bob Melvin, who plunged from 93 wins to 63 wins with basically the same roster. Bavasi's (I believe Lincoln's and Armstrong's - Dr D) managerial choice was Hargrove, who saw his winning percentage climb every season he was at the helm. I know he wasn't popular with many fans - but coming on the heels of Melvin's .389, his W% went .426, .481, .577. And Bavasi didn't choose to fire him. This is one where the move came out of the blue.
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=== 2008 ===
This is where I diverge from the masses on the analysis of why the 2008 collapse came.
Mac inherited a winning team, which ALREADY believed in itself. For most of the rest of 2007, the team was largely on auto-pilot. But, when they faltered, he couldn't right them. Hargrove 45-33; MacLaren 43-41.
Of course, sometimes circumstances beyond a manager's control can skew results. Felix missed 4 starts, (oh, wait - those were under Hargrove). Oh, and Sexson missed almost an entire month, (but wait - Broussard actually played BETTER than Sexson did all year). MacLaren actually even benefitted from the one really good month that Weaver posted.
I look at 2007 and I see the replacement manager getting practically every break in the world IN HIS DIRECTION, but dropping 10 games in win/loss differential.
In point of fact, the team climbed to 20 games over .500 early in Macs stint, (which I view as the team just basically continuing to ride the momentum Hargrove had supplied), and then lost those gains by the end of the year.
Prior to 2008, the production from the multi-year signings under Bavasi had been almost universally acceptable. One bad season for Beltre and one bad season for Sexson. But, that production went completely in the toilet for THE ENTIRE TEAM in 2008.
Okay, with Sexson I can buy the argument that talent assessment could say he's got a skill set that doesn't age well, so perhaps the decline was predictable. (This, of course, gets back to my feeling that AGE management is the organizations achilles heel). But, Delgado, who was the other highly coveted FA at the time has had a nearly identical swoon.
Those WERE the choices he had at the time. You can only make choices among available resources. His farm did NOT have a Pujols, (or even a Teixeira), as the sad fate of Chris Snelling has demonstrated.
But how can "talent assessment" be blamed for an offense that was solid in 2007 be the cause of the same squad collapsing in 2008? From my perspective, the one clear and present variable that changed was the manager.
If you want to blame Bavasi for sticking by his Manager - (which I do) - that makes sense (managerial changes are made by the Committee in Seattle, which is not unusual around baseball - Dr D).
You inherit a club that is winning and thriving and everyone is producing at or above expectation, (which was true for just about every hitter except Sexson in 2007), and they are suddenly ALL slumping. That's a major problem. But it's got nothing to do with talent assessment.
I was actually a fan of the Wilkerson signing. I saw it as very similar to Guillen, except with a different style of hitter. But, I said *BEFORE* he played a day that Wilkerson was a hitter who NEEDED to play every day and get comfortable in order to thrive. He also is not a typical lefty who cannot handle lefties - so trying a standard platoon was going to be a real big mistake. Well, MacLaren doesn't give him time to get comfortable AND starts platooning him AND he gets a minor injury keeping his playing time down. So, he's DFAed.
Toronto picks him up - and for his first 10 games he stinks, (which confirms everyone else's opinion of the guy). I continue to say, he is NOT done. He has just been mis-used. Well, as of 6/19, what has Wilkerson done in the last 28 days, (having gotten over his 10 day layoff and initial work back into things)? 23 games - 20-started; 84-PA; 72-AB; 22-H; 10-R; 5-2B; 2-HR; 9-BB; 24-K; 12-RBI; Total line of: .306/.373/.458 - for an .832 OPS. Truthfully, that's slightly above his head. He's not a "great" hitter, but he was cheap, and when used properly continues to show the ability to post .775-ish numbers.
The thing to consider here is that talent under-performing WITH SEATTLE is not necessarily about the TALENT of those players.
Pineiro had a good start to his career with Seattle, and then saw his production plunge. After posting 1.48 and 1.65 WHIPs, he got the boot. With St. Louis, he's been consistently below 1.30, (where he BEGAN his career).
Gil Meche saw his WHIP jump from 1.34 early to 1.45 to 1.57 back to 1.43 before he walked. With KC, that WHIP comes in at 1.29 and 1.37 this season. The problem is not talent ASSESSMENT. The problem is (based on evidence) almost certainly tied more to player development and utilization.
If one wants to blame the complete collapse of the Seattle defensive production on Bavasi, I'll listen. Because the defense got CONSISTENTLY worse under Bavasi. Whereas, the offense had shown gradual improvement prior to 2008.
There have been screams that Bavasi was the worst GM of ALL TIME. Well, what deal did he sign that has shown to be as unquestionablly dreadful as Oakland's acquisition of Jason Kendall? Today, there are screams, (legitimate ones) about the idiocy of signing Johjima for 3 years at $8 per year. Kendall got $10, $11 and $13 million from Oakland - and provided OPS+ figures of 79, 88 and 48 (before they managed to dump him on the Cubs).
Oakland is lauded for landing Thomas - but what about Piazza? They paid Piazza $8.5 to post half a season of 96 OPS+ production. Compare the Wilkerson pickup to the Oakland Shannon Stewart pickup. Both were for 1 year. Both were for about a million bucks. Stewart had posted 87 and 88 OPS+ figures the previous two seasons and was 33 upon arriving in Oakland. Wilkerson was younger, and had gone 86 and 104 the two years before arriving. They had IDENTIAL 106 OPS+ figures for their careers.
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From my perspective, the knock on Bavasi is primarily an emotional reaction to a series of events which were "largely", (but not completely), out of his control. Bavasi is blamed (emotionally) for the collapse of 2004. But NOTHING that Bavasi did caused that team to collapse. It was poised to implode before Bavasi was ever hired.
But the collapse becomes the first impression, and everything after that is viewed through that prism of failure.
The 2008 collapse is orchestrated by a roster selected predominantly by Bavasi. So, it makes sense to blame Bavasi. But, if one actually looks at the sequence of events and pays attention to the sequence of what happened - here is the quick and dirty of 2008 (until Bavasi's ouster).
1) Club is picked to compete for Western title or wild card.
2) Anaheim gets hit by injuries making optimistic fans even more giddy.
3) Club begins season playing .500 ball.
Note that the COLLAPSE did *NOT* occur during April. APRIL: 13-15; 245-IP; 4.12-ERA; 247-Hits; 102-BB; 172-K; 119-R; 23-HR (pitching) APRIL: .258/.321/.396/.717 - .273-BABIP; 1048-PA; 24-HR; 127-R; 92-BB; 130-K (hitting)
4) So, on April 26th, the club is 12-13, 3 games back. They give Johjima a 3-year extension worth $24 million. He is, at that point in time, the WORST performing player on the club - bar none. As of April 30th, the club is 13-15, 4.5 games back. The club DFAs Norton and Wilkerson.
Here's the thing, you've got a struggling club, and in 4 days, you REWARD the worst player on the team, and tell your ONLY productive bat off the bench to take a hike. You boot your million dollar OF pickup, (who has only played about 1/2 time due to injury and platoon). While the decision may have been made earlier, it just so happens that the Wilkerson canning is announced immediately after he's had a 3 for 3 day, raising his OBP to .348.
For me, this is a trifecta of moronic moves. You send a double message — that incompetence will be rewarded handsomely, and performance will be punished severely.
5) So, AFTER these moves, what happens? MAY: 8-20; 247-IP; 5.39-ERA; 280-Hits; 107-BB; 185-K; 164-R; 28-HR (pitching) — 11.5 games back MAY: .240/.292/.367/.660 - .267-BABIP; 1039-PA; 23-HR; 99-R; 66-BB; 163-K; (hitting)
The total team collapse can be traced almost to the minute that Johjima was extended - followed by the ousters of Norton and Wilkerson. While much rejoicing ensued with the promotions of Wlad and Clement to the majors, both would perform even worse than their predecessors during their first month in the bigs. By June 16th, (Bavasi's final day), the club was 24-46, having gone 3-11 in June, 17.5 games back.
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Can Bavasi be blamed for the 2008 woes? Yes. But it is NOT about talent assessment. It is about talent MANAGEMENT. The club made moves that could not have been more directly harmful to building a winning attitude if they had actually been designed to do so. Reward failure. Axe your best bench player. Then come out and laud your manager and blame the players.
When April ended, the team was -8 in run differential. The run differential in May was -65. If one wants to complain that the April team was only a .500 team, costing $117 million, that's a legitimate claim, backed up by data to a degree.
Just before the Johjima extension, I noted that the team was loaded with players that were under-performing and that an EXPLOSION could happen any day.
What actually happened was a series of moves that cannot be viewed as anything but a crushing psychological blow to the entire team. It never occured to me that a club would work almost methodically to destroy the morale of a team.
It makes me think of Major League, and some secret management conspiracy designed to force 100 losses so they can move the team.
My conclusion? Bavasi assembled enough TALENT that they had a legitimate shot at the playoffs. But, he then put a manager in charge whose only talent appears to have been the ability to get the least amount of production out of every player he was given. THEN Bavasi did everything in his power as GM to magnify his Manager's one apparent ability.
Did he deserve to be fired? Yes. But it wasn't due to talent assessment problems. The much, much, much larger problem was talent utilization and optimization. In that arena, Seattle has sunk to the bottom of baseball.
– Sandy Hemenway












June 28th, 2008 at 12:40 pm Quote
RE: 2007
The M’s were playing way above their pythag all year, so their dropoff was not a huge surprise, McLaren or not…
June 28th, 2008 at 12:44 pm Quote
Here is our May 13 article, Kenji Must Go …
Let me reiterate for the newbies that Kenji Johjima is one of my favorite baseball players ever … have nothing but colossal respect for him, as a player and a man …
But victim of circumstances or whatever, he never synchro’ed with the M’s …
Interesting to see Sandy’s analysis that the collapse is traced “almost to the moment” that the Committee told the clubhouse, imperiously, that they were ’stuck’ with Joh, whether they liked it or not.
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Not to say that the Mariners’ dissonance with Johjima-san is the ROOT cause. I agree with Sandy that the top-down message, the morale, the chemistry, is the cancer. Of which Johjima’s situation is a big domino, but not the only one.
June 28th, 2008 at 2:11 pm Quote
This is a beautiful synopsis:
Add to this the wobbly, panicked lack of leadership McLaren showed when the M’s bullpen started the season off a bit shaky.
I was a huge fan of the coaching staff pre-season… In retrospect, maybe it’s not such a good idea to have so many qualified & experienced coaches working UNDER a guy who’s in his first full year as a mangager, and is probably a weaker leader than they are. I think it may have helped undermine him.
Minor quibbles from me on a couple points. E.G., Foppert was nowhere close to a top-5 spec when he was acquired. Coming off of injuries, he was a high-risk spec to take. Blame to Bavasi and his scouting department for thinking he had something left.
And, a lot of the argument is framed in terms of the limited choices Bavasi had. I don’t buy that; a great leader & manager doesn’t let that stop him/her from creating success.
Great article Sandy. Love your analysis.
June 28th, 2008 at 2:38 pm Quote
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Another thing I love about Sandy’s work here, is that he has done the grunt work in drafting out the overview of Bavasi’s career.
Whether you agree or not, or have adds to his list, it’s awfully nice to have a little framework off which to talk the timeline.
Probably should “thumbtack” this article to the top right…
June 28th, 2008 at 2:41 pm Quote
Fett,
Yes, the W/L for 2007 was way over pythag. However, Matt did a wonderful job showing that the Ms were rather unique in regards to the DEGREE of the incompetence of the back end of their rotation. The 2007 results showed a nearly unique (historically speaking) collection of massive blowout losses - while having (relatively) few blowout wins.
Matt’s math claims the ‘07 club was a “legit” 86-win team. I suspect that may have been overstated slightly. The historical pen, coupled with the below replacement performance from the 4/5 starter slots ‘polluted’ pythag as a reasonable tool for judging Seattle in 2007. Even at that, it is not a stretch to say they were likely an 81-83 win team, allowing for the possibility that Matt’s math might be overstating things.
It’s important to remember that MacLaren, the guy I am convinced suppressed production, managed a .500 record for all of his 2007 stint, plus the month of April. Even if one wishes to dismiss the idea that the team was truly a realistic playoff team for 2008, every shred of evidence up until the end of April says they were *AT LEAST* a .500 team. Yet, today, they are 20 games under.
June 28th, 2008 at 3:03 pm Quote
Wonderful article Sandy. Especially liked this:
Add to this the wobbly and panicked reaction McLaren had to the early bullpen struggles. If I was a player, I’d probably have lost faith too.
I was a fan of the coaching staff before the season. In hindsight, I wonder if it was too good of a staff; if the strength of leadership and competence in the ranks worked to undermine the weaker leader at the helm.
A couple minor quibbles:
Jesse Foppert was nowhere close to a top 5 spec when traded for. He was an injury recovery project with high risk. I liked the acquisition, but blame Bavasi and his scouting department for thinking he had something left.
And much of what you document here so well is based to a degree on the notion that Bavasi had limited options. I contend that a strong and creative and visionary manager would not allow those restrictions to prevent him/her from manifesting results far superior to Bavasi’s over his tenure.
Again, great article.
June 28th, 2008 at 3:26 pm Quote
As long as we don’t get too carried away with attempts to make Bavasi look better than his worst critics maintain, I s’pose its a useful exercise. But we can’t overlook the fact that Bavasi, while inheriting a bad situation, had very high payroll to work with, the kind that should have allowed him to overcome those issues. And in the case of most every one of those “stopgap” players you dismiss, Bavasi sunk significant dollars for production that could have been obtained much more cheaply and with higher upside potential. I guess what I’m saying is, Bavasi took an inherited bad situation and squandered his resources on pieces. To me, one key fault with Bavasi was the inability to formulate and execute a sound strategic plan that leverage his advantages. So much so that the team appears to be in not much better a spot when he’s done than when he started. The fact that he left the club in a position where a major rebuilding effort is needed is “forest” evidence that requires an awful lot of “tree” evidence to counteract. Whether we call it player evaluation or whatever, his tenure was a monumental failure of the first order.
June 28th, 2008 at 5:29 pm Quote
The article by Sandy certainly provided food for thought but, as said before, the most just way to judge one’s performance is on bottom line results. That said, are the Mariners really any better off than they were in 2004? The results will not support a positive scenario under any scrutiny in Mr. Baseball’s view.
Also, as Mr. DaddyO pointed out it is not like Mr. Bavasi lacked resources.
Mr. Bavasi did have the anchor of those above him around his neck. But, it is hard for Mr. Baseball to imagine that anyone can do a worse job. Sandy did a fine job of detailing individual transactions but, at the end of the day, last is still last. Messers. Guillen, Winn, Garcia, Soriano are still gone for virtually nothing. The guy Mr. Bavasi could have chosen in the draft has a 9-1 record as a ML starter while the M’s have a good looking player who may or may not ever succeed in that critical role.
Mr. Baseball is very happy that Mr. Bavasi is out. But,of course that isn’t the whole answer for what ails the beloved M’s.
June 28th, 2008 at 6:48 pm Quote
Sandy - a great read, as always! I enjoy your informative posts.
My question is what specific actions did Mac contribute to ’suppress’ the Mariners? Intuitively, I think you are correct, but I am not sure if I see what he did wrong and should have done differently or better. Perhaps, by constantly covering for them, maybe he took away any risk of failure on their part, thus lowering performance standards?
Jpax
June 28th, 2008 at 6:50 pm Quote
I don’t know if we will ever know to what extent Bavasi’s hands were tied. It simply seemed that he was a very poor evaluator of talent. But in his defense, he did hit upon Guillen last year and Dickey this year.
June 28th, 2008 at 9:49 pm Quote
Very nice article, Sandy. I wanna be like Hemenway when I grow up…
The thing we’ve all noticed, but never put so succinctly as you have here, is that the M’s CONSISTENTLY receive worse results from their talent than other teams. Ryan Franklin is a shutdown reliever in St. Louis, for crying out loud( 2007 ERA 3.04 WHIP: 1.01, 2008 ERA: 2.94 WHIP: 1.50). The 1.50 WHIP this year is high, obviously, and the ERA is unsustainable blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah but the POINT IS that guys WILL overperform when they leave here. It’s a near constant.
June 29th, 2008 at 10:04 am Quote
A big part of pitchers performance in Seattle is defense. Individual assesments aside, there are 6 AL teams with ERAs higher than their FIP, and the gap for Seattle is more than 33% larger than the next team (TEX). We are also tied for last with Texas in DER (and 2nd worst in MLB). That makes a huge difference in pitcher’s apparent performance.
June 29th, 2008 at 12:16 pm Quote
I’m solidly behind Sandy and the work he has done. I started something similar last year, but never took it as far as he did. Bavasi had his good and bad moments, and many of his really bad moves can be blamed on the committee, but 2008 really conspired to show his weaknesses.
He was way too fond of his veteran friends, be they players or managers. Ever since the FO got lucky on Bret Boone and Ichiro in 2001, they have been seeking out the veteran gems and super bargains and gotten burned time and time again. This philosophy has now destroyed the team twice, in 2004 and now in 2008.
I’m sure the FO has no reason to intentionally sabotage the team, but Sandy is very correct in stating they couldn’t have done better if they tried. We can only hope that they have re-evaluated their thinking and will bring in a GM with some new ideas and new way of thinking. I doubt they will, but I can only hope.
I see Bavasi as a very average, old school, GM. His ability to motivate a team and pick a decent manger leave much to be desired, but talent evaluation is not his problem. His ability to bring new ideas and modern techniques to the clubhouse seems nonexistent. Until we get a more modern approach from the GM and manager, it may be many years before we see a championship in Seattle.
No, it’s not a job of a GM to motivate players, but to set the tone for the team. That’s why I used the term, “motivate a team.” Sandy is absolutely correct, the negative tone of this team came from the top down, it wasn’t bad luck, and it wasn’t players suddenly underperforming on their own.
June 29th, 2008 at 3:16 pm Quote
Spelling error.
Two of these guys were CLEARLY place-holders. Ibanez the only one sticking around for more than a year. Ibanez was picked up 12 days after Bavasi was hired, and has had 4 outstanding seasons, and is currently having a decent 5th one. The collapse had basically nothing to do with Bavasi’s talent assessment. The collapse was a result of the geriatric roster he “interited.”
I’m pretty sure you meant inherited. But I could be wrong……
June 29th, 2008 at 4:47 pm Quote
On what MacLaren did, I have no answer.
My suspicion, (supported only by results), is that his problem was likely timing and execution of whatever psychology he attempted to employ with the team - individually or as a group. Most fans and pundits write libraries about on-field decision making, lineup choices, bullpen usage, etc., etc. These are the things that are visible — and are also the things that can be judged immediately based on results from individual games. When player X blows a save - it’s easy to say the manager made the wrong choice. It takes a lot more work to go back and review every pitching change decision, and then compare it to every pitching change decision of Pineilla or Cox or Torre, (which is pretty much NEVER done). So, it’s all impossible to contradict.
As Mr. Baseball notes - the end results of 2008 are a decent enough answer to the question of whether Bavasi was worth keeping. Given 4 years to rebuild a team to his specifications, said team could be considered nothing short of an abject failure.
So, my analysis was not intended as vindication or condemnation of Bavasi - but was meant to put his history in context and attempt to perhaps reveal the WHY for the 2008 collapse. It’s easy to say “Bavasi stunk”. It’s much trickier to identify WHY he stunk, (assuming he did), and thereby grow one’s knowledge and perhaps find a way to avoid making the same mistake in the future.
There’s all kinds of data I do NOT have. The 2003 to 2004 collapse is on the surface a result of age. But, even though I accept that the team is dreadful with age management, what I don’t understand is the collapse of the defense/pitching. The team started with the same Manager thay had in 2003, and I suspect the same coaches. The simplest assessment, (barring additional info), is that since the offense collapsed (almost certainly due to age), then those same players who played defense might also have collapsed for the same reason.
But, I don’t like that explanation. Individual players do not “typically” plunge drastically defensively. It seems to be a more gradual erosion of skills. NOBODY, including me, understands baseball defense in close to the way we understand hitting.
The decline and fall of imported talent is very prevalent in the Bavasi regime. But, the most obviously consistent decline has been in the defense. Even as the team assembled an offense equal to the 2003 offense, the defense (and with it, the pitching), completely fell apart. One can blame Bavasi - but if the problem is actually some background “career” personnel issue - then the next GM is going to suffer just as much.
Was there some little known, 3rd string coach somewhere that left when Bavasi was hired, who just happened to be a critical cog in getting good data to the rest of the team in regards to making solid defensive positioning choices? I don’t know. But I do know with certainty that is IS possible for a low level flunky to have a much greater impact on the running of a large corporation than most realize.
My mom was a secretary to a Vice President in a large company. From where she sat, she got to see several different management regimes come and go. Amongst those migrations there were a number of cases where new management would deem this report or that report superfluous, and demand it be stopped. A couple of years later, someone would realize that X or Y information could be incredibly useful for a number of reasons, but suddenly they cannot access it.
In general, I think something ‘like’ my Mom’s situation is likely to have occured when Bavasi came on board. But, whatever it was, it was subtle.
2002 - Seattle 10th in DER .711
2003 - Seattle 1st in DER .726
2004 - Seattle 5th in DER .708
2005 - Seattle 11th in DER .707
2006 - Seattle 13th in DER .698
2007 - Seattle 27th in DER .678
2008 - Seattle 29th in DER .685
The 2003 performance is a spike. But the 2004 results are in line with 2002. But, the pitching results in 2004 plunged, though the defense didn’t change all that much, and none of the starters changed. Typically, it takes time for things to change drastically. Much of an organization runs on auto-pilot, with employees doing what they’ve always done, until told otherwise.
It’s easy to see WHAT happened. The numbers are there to be reviewed. The hard part is figuring out the WHY. Bill James was a major innovator because for a century baseball coaches and pundits made up the why without even having access to clear numbers of the what. So, today, we’re far better off - having scads of stats to tell us WHAT happened with some accuracy. But, often the current world of baseball analysis remains filled with the same basic problem — people come up with the WHY and then just look for the stats that can support that conclusion.
It’s a fuzzy field. There is almost NEVER going to be a case where one, and only one thing clearly explains a stat. For a decade Coors Field is a drastic hitters park. That’s known. Is it because it’s huge? It is because of the thin air? Is it because the team was built with a hitting first mentality? It’s all of those things. The thin air is WHY they made it big. The hitting first mentality was because they understood the problems with the thin air. The thin air makes a pitcher work harder to get the same break — so keeping arms rested is hard — and the change from home and away ends up impacting BOTH performances. The home park ends up impacting the road results, too. So, every pitching acquisition ends up looking dreadful.
But, you’ve gotta get to the “why” before you can fix it - if you can. Okay, the thin air is the root cause. But you can’t make the air thicker? So, can you do anything else? Why, yes. You can keep the balls from drying out in the altitude, and perhaps suppress SOME of the impact of Coors. The balls drying out at altitude would never have occured to ME. But it did to somebody. And unlike most of the other variables, it was something they COULD do something about.
While I do provide conclusions with my numbers. I think it important to keep an open mind to the why. That’s the important part. Because understanding the why is the big breakthru for creating something new.
June 29th, 2008 at 8:21 pm Quote
Not buying it. Sorry. If someone wants to convince me that Bavasi is a good evaluator of talent, they are going to have to explain the choices that were made to bring in the free agents at the given salary and years over the other players that were available at the time. Also going to have to explain the lack of focus on OBP in the lineup.
Why Spiezio at three years and $9 million as a “stop-gap” when a guy like Matt Stairs - a true stop gap - signed for 1 year and $1 million?
Ibanez can be defended but the timing of the signing - Nov 21 - cost the M’s a valuable draft pick. They were the only ones bidding - wait eleven days and keep that pick in your pocket. Too, the player that Bavasi spent his entire time in Seattle trying to acquire - the intangible, butt kicking, win mentality, clubhouse enforcer guy - Jose Guillen, signed for fewer years and less money after Ibanez signed with Seattle.
(When Bavasi finally got Guillen, he let him go, didn’t offer him arbitration and lost another pick. This type of mismanagement is simply intolerable.)
Why Carl Everett as the next stop gap at DH when Conine and Millar were both available and cheaper? Why not Lofton instead of both Everett and Lawton? Could have solved two of the free agent mistakes from that off season in one shot with Lofton.
Why Washburn at 4 years and $38 million when Paul Byrd signed for 2 years and $14 million? Same exact guy, when you get down to it. ERA+ of 93 and 100 for Byrd; 95 and 100 for Washburn in 2006 and 2007.
Why Silva at 4 years and $48 million when Kyle Lohse - the guy mentioned in the same sentence as Silva all off season - went for 1 year and $4.25 million?
Nah - Bavasi has shown a tendancy to overvalue “intangibles”. He’s shown a maddening tendency to apply a label to a need and then go after a player that he thinks fits the defined label, regardless of the facts. Innings eaters. LH sock. Grit. Winner. Bleh. And overpay for players that he feels the label fits, in both dollars and years
This 25 man roster is Bavasi’s and it’s mostly bad. He didn’t inherit a stable of hitters that show no patience, draw no walks and tend to slump. He deliberately built this lineup with no attention to OBP. He deliberately used his best SP chit in the minors - Morrow - to patch up his bullpen, which created an extra hole in the starting lineup, which in turn gave us Mr Silva.
Good riddance, Mr. Bavasi. Enjoy your career as Special Assistant to the GM wherever you land.
June 30th, 2008 at 3:21 am Quote
Sandy
I fully supported Bavasi up until the time he traded Soriano for Ramirez because he had nothing to work with except for the FA market for quite awhile. I even though I understood why we always came out on the short end of the stick on every one of his trades because I over valued the players we had. Come to find out, Bavasi does his best work with just flushing money down the toilet. He never once used a $400K player we had when he could get the same thing in FA for $10M. He’s then turn around and flush the $400K player down the toilet for nothing. I still can’t believe they continued to go after Bedard after they signed Silva. It was a terrible risk, at exactly the wrong time, and the cost went way past excessive. This is when I realized that someone had to stop him before he crippled this team even worse with another idiotic trade. Thank God someone else in the FO finally realized he had to be stopped and canned him. Bavasi totally mismanaged the resources he had and I couldn’t be happier that he’s gone. On the bright side of things, they don’t have to do any thinking on how to get rid of Sexson, Vidro, and Cairo. They just go away next year. The can go with resigning Ibanez for 1B and rushing Saunders up for next year and do it with a $105M budget using a few other players on the bench they already have. They could trade Washburn or Batista and bring in one more position player without hurting anything. The Farm System is in great shape and will look even better at the end of this year. There is no reason to have a fire sale just to be having one. A few smart trades would really put the M’s in a position to be good in two years. Now that Bavasi is gone, at least there is the possibility of making a good trade.
June 30th, 2008 at 9:06 am Quote
My initial reaction is very close to Mt. Grizzly’s but Sandy has put a lot of work into this and I think it deserves more consideration. I agree with Dr. D that it is a good framework with which to start. Too bad we couldn’t all sit in a room for a day or two and objectively get all the facts together and using this kind of framework see where the conclusion really takes us.
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Anyway I am going to add my twelve cents.
Bavasi seemed to ignore or be unaware of SABR tools that could have improved his talent evaluation. Like them or not, USS Mariner showed us why stats like XFIP predicted that Bavasi was over rating players like Washburn and Silva. Forgetting trading away Snelling, the salary Bavasi took on to get a no power DH was crazy. Almost everyone on the planet thought he was a fool for trading Soriano for HoRam. And I am not talking about evaluations that were made in hind site but at the time of the acquisitions.
Bavasi traded useful players like Moyer and Winn for a revolving door of AA / at best AAA pitchers. He should have been able to get more for his trades.
He also failed to recognize the significant contribution an outfield of Winn, Cameron and Ichiro made to his pitchers’ performance, especially in Safeco. Continuing to allow the field manager to play Ibanez in left field shows that he still doesn’t understand the value of outfield defense.
Just when you think Bavasi has picked up a valuable bench bat overlooked by others, (Norton, Broussard, Petagine, etc.) he allows his field manager to give them no at bats or drops them alltogether while Willy Bloomquist is given hundreds of at bats to prove he is an excellent pinch runner and emergency fielder.
When evaluating Bavasi don’t forget the money he was willing to throw at Zito. It was not Bavasi’s excellent judgement that we dodged that bullet, just dumb luck.
As MtGrizzly alluded to, you cannot ignore salaries when doing an analysis like this. You can’t just compare Silva to Baek and not factor in salary and opportunity cost.
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As much as I think many understate the role of the Manager, I think Sandy has over stated it. If McLaren had stayed on as Manager I believe many players would have reggressed to their means, and if there had been no injury to Putz and no injuries to key players going forward, the team would finish the year at .500 or better. The extention of Johjima and the other two moves mentioned, despite creating some tension in the clubhouse, could not make Batista, Washburn and Silva have by far their worst years ever. It could not cause every player on the team to have an OPS below .800 at the same time. Remember all those years that Oakland got off to a slow start and Beane continued to say by the end of the season his players would be where they were supposed to be? I think Sexson and Vidro should have been replaced, but even if they were kept around, along with Mclaren, this team would not finish below .450, especially if Putz stayed healthy.
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In an effort to provide balance I liked the acquisition of Beltre and Sexson at the time. The acquisition of both these players broke the “true stars need not apply” mold in Seattle. I liked the pursuit of Bedard because it also broke a barrier in the way the team had been run(though I thought we bid against ourself too much). I liked the pick up of Dickey and, believe it or not, Rhodes. I loved the acquistion of Bettancourt and Johjima when they happened.
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Oh well, forget all the above. I just won’t forgive Bavasi for four things. Not drafting Linecum or Miller. Trading) Soriano for HoRam, Not trying Morrow in the rotation and outbidding himself for Bedard by including Sherrill (this is not just hind site. At the time I thought that if we were in a win now mode it did not make sense to include a key reliever when we were including so many valuable prospects already).
1.
June 30th, 2008 at 9:15 am Quote
I pretty much echo #7, #8, #16.
There is definetly a tendency for players to perform better when they leave, but I don’t see how that excuses Bavasi’s job here in Seattle. Worst $/Win in all of baseball during the Bavasi era, and several horrible trades and FA signings. Silva, HoRam, Washburn, Batista, etc.. Aurilia, Everett, Vidro, etc. These are the types of moves that top GMs like Epstein and Beane don’t even “consider” for a millisecond.
For me, I was still open to Bavasi until the ‘04/’05 offseason. When he signed Washburn and Everett… thats when he lost me for good. I couldn’t justify those moves without coming to the conclusion that the guy was clueless (and he managed to follow that up with even worse moves like HoRam, Silva, Vidro, the list goes on).
When it comes down to it, Bavasi’s results as a GM are worse than ANYones over the past five years (including Sabean).
June 30th, 2008 at 9:27 am Quote
Its not just SABR tools though, both of those guys REEKED from scouting standards.
You have two guys with declining fastballs and mediocre stuff at the time, and Bavasi chooses to throw them premium long term contracts. What in the WORLD did he see in HoRam? Even Doc was trying to defend the deal and couldn’t come up with anything postive, either than his manager liking him..I just don’t GET it. You REALLY have to be terrible at talent evaluation to think those moves were a good idea. Its hard for me to even understand how a professional major league GM can be so out of touch… Bavasi would get ROASTED in any competitive fantasy league.
June 30th, 2008 at 10:26 am Quote
Didn’t know where to post this…the AL’s complete dominance over the NL continues:
http://www.athleticsnation.com/2008/6/27/559947/arena-baseball-the-americ
The M’s actually did ok against the NL. I wonder if we’d be a .500 team there?
June 30th, 2008 at 11:24 am Quote
There’s just far more pitching talent in the AL now than the NL…there has to be to combat the DH…that’s how it works over here and that’s why the DH is good for baseball and should be adopted by the NL (it would force more league parity between the two leagues, force teams to put more emphasis on developing pitching and improve the whole pitching talent pool).
June 30th, 2008 at 12:24 pm Quote
MtGrizzly wrote:
First off, at no point did I claim he was a GOOD evaluator of talent. I said he was not a BAD one. I’ve said on multiple occasions, in different posts, Bavasi’s talent assessment is about average COMPARED TO OTHER GMs.
OBP, by itself, doesn’t make one a good or bad judge of talent. OBP is very important, but the explosion of people enamored of it largely draw from “Moneyball”. But, the point of moneyball was NOT that OBP was the ultimate key to success and ONLY way to win. OBP - at that time - was the most under-valued skill. That has changed, at least in part due to moneyball. The Yankees are paying Abreu $15+ million to post his .360 OBP.
Well, NEITHER of these points has anything to do with talent assessment. Failing to play the system may be an absolute on-target assessment of Bavasi. I don’t have the data to say yes or no. But the general complaint here (other than playing the system well), seems to be an indication that Bavasi needed to pay more attention to intangibles.
Do you know for certain that no offer was made to either guy? I don’t. I know that lots of players have lots of different reasons for signing in different places. Just because a guy signs for 2-years cheap in town X does NOT mean that he would sign the same (or even better contract) in town Y. If I judged every FA contract for 2008 by comparing to the Casey deal, then 29 GMs are hopeless. But Casey wanted to a shot at a ring - and there was a small set of teams where that probability is high.
Well, Bryd was 35 in 2006 and Washburn 31. Signing the 35-year-old to a 4-year would’ve been unforgiveable. Frankly, your choice of comp is nice - and IMO shows that Bavasi was paying REASONABLE market price. Stat-wise, the two pitchers do compare reasonably well, with Wash having better Ks, but not quite as stingy in walks. But, Washburn was 4 years younger, meaning the RISK on Byrd collapsing or falling to injury was SIGNIFICANTLY higher than for Wash. Does Washburn’s contract look exorbitant compared to Jon Garland?
You mean *EXACTLY* like Anaheim? Anaheim stands 13th in OBP TODAY. Anaheim picked up and cut Jeff Weaver once upon a time. Anaheim is the team that traded Orlando Cabrera for Garland. If looking only from a SABR perspective, $12 million for Garland is an even worse deal than Washburn for $10. But Garland is doing okay for Anaheim.
Garland’s DIPs ERA is 5.00 and Washburn’s only 4.56. Silva is at 4.60. Byrd’s DIPs is currently sitting at 5.91.
If one is going to complain about ignoring sabremetric stats, then one should be able to use them to support the argument. Paul Byrd is currently the WORST pitcher in the entire AL by DIPs — and HE is the argument being used to decry Washburn? Considering the state of the Seattle defense, I personally have ZERO doubt that Byrd or Garland or Kenny Rogers or Brian Bannister — pick any of the dozens of low-K control guys out there — would’ve done significantly worse in Seattle.
What gets me is that given the dreadful state of the Seattle defense, people SHOULD have been applauding Washburn’s 2007 performance as a stunning show of grit and determination. Because despite a defense that SHOULD have doomed Wash completely, he STILL managed to post a 4.32 ERA.
I wonder how many people know that in 2007, Silva’s 4.19 ERA was IDENTICAL to his DIPs ERA. Mark Buerhle had a nearly identical DIPs ERA in 2007 to Silva. He’s making $14 million.
If one wants to cherry-pick examples to prove points, there’s always going to be GMs overpaying for performance and always going to be guys getting deals and steals.
Bavasi got Ibanez WAY below market value, and has gotten exceptional production out of him, yet he isn’t typically even mentioned as a Bavasi pick-up — and Griz wants to complain about waiting. MAYBE, if he had waited, Ibanez doesn’t sign — maybe the jumping the gun is what allowed Bavasi to get the incredible steal he got.
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As for the Soriano/HoRam trade — I agree that he should’ve gotten more for Soriano. But, as it turns out, Soriano has been on the DL just about as much as he’s been healthy. And Soriano’s DL time is one of the reasons the Braves just set a new world record for consecutive one-run-loss-on-the-road streaks.
Part of understanding how good a GM is depends on understanding how good OTHER GMs happen to be. Anaheim has a lineup that is nearly identical to Seattle’s in terms of ‘flavor’. They are dreadful in OBP, rely heavily on batting average, and despite a recent infusion of youth, they are nearing critical mass age at a number of positions. So, what did they do in 2008? They signed Torii Hunter, a .793 OPS guy (104 OPS+) to a 5-year $90 million contract, which starts at age 32.
Nobody wants to hear it, but Anaheim and Seattle are nearly clones of each other - except Anaheim plays defense.
Let’s look right now:
Offense: .avg/ OBP/slug (league ranks)
Seattle: .256/.314/.376 (11/14/13) 14th in runs
Anaheim: .256/.316/.381 (11/13/12) 12th in runs
Defense: HR / BB / K — Hits - Runs (ranks in AL)
Seattle: 71 / 299/ 534 - 747 - 390 (6/10/7 - 11 - 13)
Anaheim: 76 / 242/ 512 - 701 - 328 (7/4/10 - 6 - 5)
The team LEADING the division has an offense nearly identical in production.
In pitching, Anaheim has better control, and a solid defense.
Heck, if you actually get Batista out off the mound, the control disparity practically vanishes between the two teams. Is Gary Matthews 5/50 contract Seattle’s? No. Anaheim is paying Matthews a LOT more than Vidro is getting, and is committed for longer. For all the wailing and gnashing of teeth about Vidro at DH - Anaheim is winning with a combo of Garrett Anderson (76 OPS+) and Matthews (84 OPS+).
I’ve repeatedly stated that the reason Seattle has plunged this season has been drastically more because of the pitching side than the hitting side. I stated LAST SEASON that the Seattle and Anaheim offenses were nearly clones of each other, (and my observation was dismissed back then).
June 30th, 2008 at 7:00 pm Quote
Taro #19
There was no excuse for Everett except the 06’ season was going to be a wasted year and the contract was only for one year. I was still dumb enough to believe that they couldn’t trade for anything better than Washburn because they had nothing to trade with so they came up with the best they could to try and eliminate a future problem. I still didn’t understand that the real problem was that Bavasi was totally incapable of doing his job. The reason for trading Winn was so they could acquire a big LH bat in the OF. They still don’t have that player today. They traded away Moyer during the 06’ season so they could get younger and better the next season and they ended up with Ramirez and Batista. I think your assessment that those moves were followed by even worse ones is correct as those moves were the basis for this disaster in 08’.
I’m more concerned now with the internal workings of this organization pertaining to the under performance of their players and their inability to properly produce players from their Farm System. One recent example is Bibens-Dirkx where they have changed his throwing motion and he’s currently useless. They also changed Reed’s swing and then he got hurt. It took him most of last year to get back on track again. There shouldn’t be any surprise that he’s hitting again and is no worse than a 4th OF’er. There are other examples but, now that Bavasi is gone, maybe they can stamp out this stupidity with a competent GM. There is something fundamentally wrong inside this organization that must be corrected or there is no hope. Is it Armstrong and Lincoln or is it something being done at the lower levels?
June 30th, 2008 at 7:47 pm Quote
This raises the question which has intrigued me: Are the M’s in fact worse than most other teams in successfully developing promising talent? Yes, we have a lot of anecdotal evidence (Reed being one example, Olivo another, Lopez another) where it’s been said that the M’s tinkered with swings, or pitching motions and seemed to be counterproductive in their approach. But we do not know how much the same thing is said to happen on other teams. And we don’t know how many times tampering (i.e., coaching) has actually produced its intended effect (admittedly the fact that so few Mariners have progressed and had good seasons may help answer this). So is it just that we’re frustrated overall and only focus on the M’s failures, or is it demonstrably a serious institutional problem? I intuitively favor the latter, but perhaps I’m wrong.
OK, class. Discuss
June 30th, 2008 at 8:28 pm Quote
Somethimg which is not discussed here is the 40 man roster.
From MC by IWANTBAVASI’SJOB
As for pitchers 40 man management Bavasi was poor I think.
June 30th, 2008 at 8:38 pm Quote
Bavasi was TERRIBLE at the 40-man…that was a consistent problem I noticed…he always had too many AAAA guys on the roster for insurance purposes instead of putting people with a future in the big leagues in a position to get called up when injuries struck. This year is no exception.
July 1st, 2008 at 10:56 am Quote
DaddyO wrote:
This is an excellent opening for the discussion of talent development and management as opposed to talent judgement.
My intuition regarding Seattle compared to other organizations, (and I use intuition, because I lack specific knowledge on all 30 teams), would be an assessment that overall, the Seattle farm system HAD BECOME extremely poor during the glory years. But, it is important to remember that the better the team, the worse the draft picks. Griffey and AROD were both #1 overall picks. But, once you start winning, you stop getting those picks.
Bavasi’s resume was actually strongly directed toward minor league development. I believe the general trend under Bavasi was actually in the right direction. But, like the original roster he began with, he was starting basically from scratch. While I don’t like the “style” of player the club seemed to focus on, (low-K free-swingers), I can appreciate the concept that you cannot teach athleticism. So, you draft athletes and hope you can add on other skills. (I personally believe this approach is flawed, and creates as many problems as it solves).
I suspect that the high-walk guys that Beane built his club around are actually much more open to coaching. The fast-twitch hitters like Lopez, YuBet and Joh are all reaction. THINKING gets in the way of their primary talent. The high walk, patient guy is (I suspect), in most cases a more cerebral hitter. He’s THINKING at the plate already, which means adding coaching thoughts is building on what is already there.
But it’s also important to realize the minor league rosters were getting more robust. Guys like Jones, Clement and Wlad were certainly not Lopez clones. The minors were in the process of becoming a more robust garden to pick from. But these things take time.
The club has shown a far above average track record developing bullpen arms. Whoever or whatever is behind it - they tend to make a lot more good decisions than bad. Cleveland, for all the plaudits they’ve received for talent development, are in a near perpetual state of bullpen desperation. The Braves, masters of developing talent, also have typically done much better bringing a dozen journeyman into camp and keeping the best 6 than in relying on what they could develop in house.
I believe that the talent “development” in the minors is probably overall average, but trending upward. The big problem during the Bavasi era has been specifically tied to under-performance at the major league level. The low-K guys typically get long looks, as long as their Ks don’t get high. But the guys with more robust skill sets don’t seem to get much time to prove themselves. Clement and Wlad both had little patience displayed during their early struggles.
The starting pitchers who have come and gone suffered from poor defense, getting blamed for the real major hole in the Seattle machine. With an average defense, Meche could’ve been a solid contributor. Instead, he gets the Safeco Sieve, and is sent packing. It doesn’t help when guys like Wash and Silva do exactly what they’ve always done - but get verbally abused by the fans because the defense leaks more than Washington in an election year.
Some of the angst is just unrealistic expectations. It’s typical to remember every failure for YOUR team, but you only pay attention to the successes for other teams in most cases. The Braves were absolutely destroyed by the Prospect Press for letting Andy Marte go for Renteria. Of course, turning Renteria into Jurjens makes the Braves look a lot smarter today. People forget that guys like Schmidt and Dye were traded away by the Braves before they showed their true potential.
Then there are guys like Marquis and Odalis Perez, who become journeyman — but who each at different times have had incredible seasons here and there. Each showed that with the proper support - they COULD (and did) succeed. But, it is MUCH easier (and more normal) for organizations, (baseball or otherwise), to attempt to screw every peg into whatever hole the club has fashioned. The cream organizations, (St. Louis), figure out what the player’s skill set is - and then set about to maximize the production that is there naturally.
I think the org/MacLaren screwed up most of the team by pushing plate patience during ST. The club came out of the gate way more patient than normal, and because nobody was expecting it, it paid off in the short term. But, when the opposition caught on and adjusted, the players had lost their feel for THEIR skills. I get the sense that a bunch of players were ASKED to do things beyond their skillsets. “Vidro - we need more power from you this season.” “Joh, Beltre, you need to draw more walks.” I don’t know what suggestions came when these experiments started falling apart. I think Lopez and YuBet basically just went back to their natural skill sets.
But, hitting is an ebb and flow reality. Pitchers are constantly adjusting to what the hitters are doing - and the hitters SHOULD be adjusting back. Albert Pujols is lauded by almost every scout on the planet because he will make adjustments practically from pitch to pitch. He’s like Ichiro - but with a willingness to take a walk, and more natural power.
If I had to guess, (and I really do have to guess), I think if the hitters were going up to the plate with a game plan of any kind - it was supplied by MacLaren - and it was the proper gameplan for 6 games earlier. It’s like handing your chess opponents what your next three moves are going to be, and then making those moves regardless of what the opponent does. My sense of the May/June Mariners is that they were playing two moves behind their opponents.
Normally, I would say you’re better off having a bad plan than no plan at all. But in this case, I think if the opponent is more in tune with your plan than you are, you’re probably better off not having a plan.
In the end, what I DO know about prospect development is that you’ve got something more than a 2/3 FAILURE rate over all teams. Most specs never come close to meeting the overblown expectations of the spec watchers. And “average” major league production from a prospect is actually something to be happy about.
I suspect that most of the worst problems within the Ms org are actually mostly isolated to the major league level. The were poor under Hargrove, (especially defensively), and got much worse under MacLaren). But it would not surprise me at all for this team to go something like 45-36 over the second half of the season. And if we see some genuine improvement in DER in the 2nd half - then I would be VERY strongly in favor of sticking with Riggleman.
July 1st, 2008 at 2:14 pm Quote
Your usual good work, Sandy.
The following in particular caught my eye:
This whole paragraph strikes me as a superb concept and deserves prolonged pondering. Are you reading, Pelekoudas? Riggleman?
Also…
Put this together, you could posit that the REASON the M’s don’t develop good OBP/Power guys and the REASON their low BB/low K players don’t develop as well as hoped are all part and parcel of the same flawed approach.
In the immortal words of the Craw from “Get Smart” (the old TV show), “Velly Intellesting!”
July 2nd, 2008 at 1:37 am Quote
New owner???
http://cbs.sportsline.com/mlb/story/10884085
[WORDPRESS HASHCASH] The poster sent us ‘0 which is not a hashcash value.
July 2nd, 2008 at 1:39 am Quote
New owner?
http://cbs.sportsline.com/mlb/story/10884085
[WORDPRESS HASHCASH] The poster sent us ‘0 which is not a hashcash value.
July 2nd, 2008 at 7:37 am Quote
Excellent work as usual, Sandy!
This not directly on point, but it just hit me the other day that the following people who either got tired of the Ms, or the Ms got tired of them, will likely be involved in the NL playoffs or at least deep into September:
Lou Piniella
Pat Gillick
Bob Melvin
Jamie Moyer
Randy Johnson
Not so much as to the specific names, but I want to raise this question: pretty much every larger-than-life personality with enduring Hall-of-Fame level skills at any facet of the organization (player, manager, front office) has ended up leaving.
The ones who stick around (Edgar, Ichiro) are low-key with great skills but not much force of personality.
I think you can argue that, on top of the talent development and the OBP and the defensive positioning, this team has no “straw that stirs the drink” anywhere in the organization, top to bottom.
July 2nd, 2008 at 7:48 am Quote
The reason the good people we develop leave: the ownership is bad and everyone knows it. The good players enjoy winning. Elsewhere.
Change the ownership of the team will continue its’ mediocrity.
July 2nd, 2008 at 9:49 am Quote
I have been stewing over the Merrynerds for years. It seems that the way the FO vets new hires, sets FO style, and establishes their own corp. culture resembles the FOs of Walmart, or TacoBell, namely — pasty-faced, business PC-oriented, cautious, feminist-speaking, feminist image-making (see those demeaning ads!!), confrontation-averse, and pro-process and relationship (ugh!) IN SHORT: the Merrynerds look like a bunch of gals who meet regularly and all hate eachother… a den of cats. Once in a while we produce an alpha-male, a guy with great talent and focus, and THEY CANNOT LAST in this soft know-nothing environ. Hell. Just look at the Seattle fans, all sitting around like they are at a sushi bar feeling proud of themselves, while our insipid stadium plays numb-nuts heavy metal rock, plays video games on the big telly, and commands when to shout and when to applaud. (It’s sickening). I’ve lived in St. L. (where I became a fan at age 11), and in NY and Boston, although I’ve been in Seattle a long time now. THere’s no comparison. It’s still a men’s game in those places, and the FOs are run by men who speak their mind and not afraid of breaking the damn circle of feline relations. The Nerds will not grab the whole prize until the team is sold to management consisting of hail-fellow well-met good ol’ boys who can recognize alpha-men when they see them… not our current FO, a bunch of lawyering, PC-speaking feminists. … well I got that off my mind.
July 4th, 2008 at 9:34 pm Quote
I know an extremely small sample size at this point, but not just the 9-5 record so far, but the visible play just seems a little sharper and little more focused. What type of record with Riggleman have to have at the helm to show that Mclaren was if not entirely at least a very large part of the collapse? Or is it impossible to tell? 9-5 of course is too small, but 20 - 12? 30 - 17? if gets to something like that, what will that tell us, and will that change anyone’s thoughts on a Managers role, and how much they can truly affect the game in terms of wins and loses. Or is it all just regression to the mean, and Mclaren just didn’t have enough time to ride out the slump.
July 4th, 2008 at 11:20 pm Quote
let’s cross that bridge when we come to it.
First…let’s win some games.
July 8th, 2008 at 1:38 pm Quote
Seems like there is lots of talk about how Riggleman may have saved our defense. And of course there is the fact that we are playing over .500 baseball with him at the helm.
So with that in mind, is Riggleman a legit option to be the fulltime manager in ‘09?
Is he the front runner right now?
If he ends his half season of managing the M’s with a +15, +10 or even +5 over .500 record, then what?
July 8th, 2008 at 1:58 pm Quote
A: I’d like to know whether there are any precedents, for a manager having two (long) disappointing stints like Riggs did in SD and CHC, and then having a great run for a third team. There probably are, undoubtedly when somebody went to the Yankees for the 3rd gig.
My rule of thumb is, if a guy’s doing a good job, don’t switch. But I wonder whether Riggleman’s proven his level.
………………
I think of a manager as a guy who can (help) pick his roster — in Lou fashion — and then mold those 25 guys into an army. Riggs is doing a good job rallying somebody else’s players, but am not sure he molded anything impressive in SD or CHC.
So, naturally, given Chuck’s inclination to pick the roster from the boardroom and then hire a field manager to make the pitching switches, I’m sure Riggleman has the inside track for 09.
July 30th, 2008 at 10:45 pm Quote
It is now 3+ weeks later, and Riggleman is now -5 as M’s captain. While that’s better than mac’s mark, it’s safe to say that it would’ve been tough for Lou or Hargrove to top .500 with this roster (Lou never really did much in Tampa Bay did he).
Oh, as for a manager having a poor record for a couple of clubs and then striking it hot in the third times a charm type of way, check out Joe Torre’s career before he ended up in the Bronx.
July 31st, 2008 at 2:49 am Quote
If you look at team record vs. pythag record, Jim Riggleman rates as an outstanding field manager over his career.
I think he can maximize the roster he has…I just don’t know about him picking a good roster.
July 31st, 2008 at 5:13 am Quote
In fairness to Riggs … he is NOT playing with the same roster that MacLaren had.
In his 34 games, he’s had three starts from Bedard, (3 wins).
Sexson, as bad as he was, was tossed, so Cairo got more PT. (He was 10-8 during the period where he had both Sexson and Bedard, just fyi).
=======
On the plus side, LaHair is the first spec to come up and have some immediate success in a long time. In truth, a Cairo/LaHair platoon at first could be pretty good, (Cairo actually hits lefties pretty well. Not the pop you’d prefer out of a 1B, but his real value is in keeping the pressure off LaHair to have to struggle against lefties).
In my mind, the failure of the Ms this season is shared among many, but the order the *I* would place blame would be …
1) Johjima - OPS+ of 47 makes him worse than useless - it takes TWO solid hitters to make up for his debacle.
2) Vidro - OPS+ of 64 also requires two batters to make up the difference. So, now you need a quartet of 110+ hitters just to get back to even.
3) Ichiro — this is one where I’m gonna get flack. But, like it or not, Ichiro has been the star of the team for a long time. His horrid spring could not have been a plus for any of the players around him. And having his worst season of his career immediately after signing the bloated long term contract is a double-whammy. Even with his speed and as a lead-off hitter, he *HAS* to carry an .800 OPS, (or at least flirt with it), and that expectation is based on a career worst .786 OPS. The .732 OPS by itself doesn’t feel as detrimental as it actually is. He’s gonna set career worsts in almost every stat except walks and steals. When your table setter goes from Bone China to paper plates and plastic forks, the meal is simply not going to be as good.
4) Putz — not his fault — injuries happen. But the bullpen was destroyed not by Sherrill’s loss, but the loss of the “guaranteed” save. That mindset of a can’t miss 9th inning guy feeds into the rest of the pen. It would probably surprise almost everyone to hear that the 2008 bullpen is a half run BETTER than 2007 in ERA.
Not only that, but in 2007, the pen was 1.1 runs better than the starters, and in 2008 they are 1.3 runs better. The gap between SPs and RPs is *LARGER* this season than it was when HoRam and Weaver were fouling the data pool. There simply isn’t any TEAM confidence that leads will stand up - therefore, they don’t.
=======
I don’t blame Sexson, because he was basically still doing the same thing he did in 2007, (actually a few points better). His stroke was back (on the road), but his head was destroyed in front of the home folks.
I don’t blame Wilky, who only got 56 ABs, and was sent packing with his 81 OPS+, while Wlad got 107 ABs of posting a 66 OPS+.
I don’t blame Bedard, who pitched well when healthy, and who basically got almost no acknowledgement of what he WAS doing - only what he wasn’t.
=================
As for the rest of the season?
LaHair/Cairo at first, I like.
I would like to see Clement exclusively play catcher — he has shown an incredible lack of ability to DH. I think Johjima needs to be treated as a backup catcher, and doesn’t need to play DH, except as an occasional day to rest Vidro’s knees.
I have no problem with Vidro playing out the year at DH, because the club doesn’t have any better options - at least not until Wlad returns, at which point, Ibanez needs to be DHing the rest of the way. (Though I’m still thinking Ibanez ends up traded today).
July 31st, 2008 at 5:47 am Quote
If Vidro plays out the year, his third year will vest and we’ll owe him 8 million next year. That’s why he has to go.
July 31st, 2008 at 6:40 am Quote
Matt,
I’ve heard many different numbers from different sources regarding Vidro’s vesting option. The primary one is he needed 600 PAs THIS SEASON to vest.
He’s got 315 currently, with 55 games remaining. It’s mathematically impossible for him to vest if those numbers I’ve heard are correct.
Me? I don’t know what the vesting particulars are. But the question I have is this. If I assume he CAN actually still vest for 2009, so what? WHO is he blocking? Do the Ms actually have a potential DH waiting in the wings who is ready to take over? LaHair is a 1B, so it can’t be him - and the Ms don’t have any other 1B choices.
Is everyone thinking the 37-year-old Ibanez is going to be a significant plus for the team as a space-filler during reconstruction compared to the younger Vidro?
In 2009, the Ms have to play SOMEONE at DH. The only plus about letting Vidro go is saving a few bucks. So what? It’s dollars spent in a rebuilding year. Why are the fans so enthralled with increasing profits for the owners that they loathe so much? If you hate the owners so much, why not encourage them to make LESS money, so maybe they’ll stop doling out late-career mega-deals to players in decline.
Sadly, the Johjima contract is the *ONLY* reason that Vidro’s status makes any difference at all. If Clement CAN learn to hit major league pitching, then he needs to be catching, and Joh needs to be sitting. I hate the idea of *EITHER* playing DH.
Now, if you’re talking about lineup flexibility, and constructing a WINNING lineup, then Vidro is a disaster. ONCE REBUILT, if you cannot have an Ortiz or Thomas level everyday DH, then I think you’re way better off carrying an extra fielder, and create a rotation of your best hitters, giving them 1/2 days off — (like Anaheim, where no single guy has 40 DH days yet).
But, reconstruction of a team is NOT the same as fielding a winning team. ME? I want to make certain that anyone not pegged as a cog in the FUTURE machine is extreme-low-maintenance. The production is irrelevant. If you’re developing specs, you need time and effort to develop them. Sexson was a high-maintenance player, likely to pollute a learning environment. Vidro shows every sign of being the consumate organization guy - willing to do whatever is asked of him - even when destroying his own production. This is not a bad guy to have DURING REBUILDING.
While his production is irrelevant in my mind, I’m not convinced he is completely done. I think he could become an Orlando Palmeiro for the next 4-5 years — a veteran guy who can carry an empty .280 average off the bench. Is he overpaid for that role? Sure. But in 2009, the LAST THING the team needs to do is spend money on the future - they need to build for the future with youth. Spending money on Vidro is simply reducing the risk of doing something else as stupid as the Joh or Ichiro extensions.
July 31st, 2008 at 7:55 am Quote
so what?? We need to SPEND that money…that’s 8 million dollars we won’t have to buy free agents we need to rebuild a franchise.
BTW…I thought the vesting option was at 375 at bats.
July 31st, 2008 at 11:17 am Quote
I heard it was 425 or 450?
I don’t think anyone in the blogosphere really knows.
July 31st, 2008 at 12:04 pm Quote
#44
Matt, I disagree 100%. You do not *BEGIN* rebuilding by spending money on free agents, (unless they are 1-year hires, which you are planning to try and deal at the deadline for prospects — something the Pirates are actually decent at).
Paying big money for your FIRST pieces is ***EXACTLY*** what Bavasi did - and the end result was that when the prospects did NOT break through, the high priced FAs had actually begun to decline, and worked AGAINST plugging the final holes via FA.
If you want to fill holes X,Y and Z in FA, then you are banking on the ability to have 100% of your prospects produce exactly as expected. If that fails, (and it will - because nobody comes remotely close to that success rate), then you HAVE to go out and get another set of high priced FAs.
Additionally, by STARTING rebuilding with high priced FAs, you’re paying big bucks during the period where you EXPECT to lose. If these high priced FAs are actually good enough to mitigate losing, then you are ALSO hurting your draft position in the process.
So, my perspective is that STARTING a rebuild by spending lots of money on FAs means that you are hurting your draft, spending excess money to lose, and reducing roster flexibility in regards to which prospects will or will not succeed.
You develop prospects like Smoltz, Glavine, Average, Justice — and *THEN* you go and start acquiring guys like Maddux, Pendleton, McGriff as you see holes you are not capable of filling with prospects.
Or, you pick up specs like Derek Lee, Mike Lowell, while developing your pitching staff, and then bring in Pudge Rodriquez to fill that gaping hole at catcher when you’re CLOSE to winning.
=======
July 31st, 2008 at 12:07 pm Quote
That’s fine Sandy…but we have 120 million dollars (roughly) to spend on payroll…I don’t see how spending 8 million on Vidro in 2009 helps the rebuild.
July 31st, 2008 at 12:11 pm Quote
Incidentlly Sandy…who is Vidro blocking? My great grandfather could outhit him. ANYONE from our AAA line-up right now is a better fit for this team than Vidro.
July 31st, 2008 at 1:12 pm Quote
But does bringing them up NOW help THEM?
If you are rebuilding, then any mention of “who can outhit whom” is completely irrelevant.
8 million to Vidro doesn’t help rebuild.
8 million to Ibanez doesn’t help rebuild.
8 million to any players on the entire planet who are not going to be around when the rebuild is complete doesn’t help the rebuild.
THAT is my point.
Keeping Vidro “might” help keep someone valuable in AAA for long enough to learn their craft sufficiently so they can handle the leap to the majors.
There IS a point where players NEED to move to the majors to continue their learning curve - when they’ve plugged all the holes in their game that they can against AAA competition. THEN, it is beneficial to bring them up - and hopefully give them enough time to adapt.
Adam Jones indicated that AAA was no longer a challenge for him in 2007. But, in 2008, playing full time, mostly batting 7th and 8th (no need to add pressure), he posted a .700 OPS in April, but only a .585 OPS in May. Baltimore stuck with him, and he worked thru whatever was ailing him. In June: .804 — July .780. It has taken 2/3 of the season, but he’s finally beginning to show a little of what was expected. He still has work to do to fulfill his potential - but he’s managed to climb to “competent” major league bat for the moment.
But, bringing up a 20-year-old, so he can hit post a .500 OPS for a year does NOT help him. Players do not get better BECAUSE they age. They do not improve BECAUSE they see major league pitching. They get better because they improve “something” that they are lacking. They add skill, refine approaches, improve pitch recognition — any number of things. But EVERY MLB club is set up that these items are better TAUGHT in the minors.
Could you simply bring up Wlad and Tui tomorrow? Sure. Is this better *FOR THEM*? Does that improve THEIR chances of success down the line? What happens TODAY on the Ms is irrelevant to the future. It will not matter in 2010 whether Vidro was DH or Craig Wilson — because neither will be on the team at that point. ALL that matters is maximizing the development and advancement of your prospects. And shoving them into the majors before they are ready does NOT accomplish that.
July 31st, 2008 at 8:59 pm Quote
Sandy brings up a point that often gets overlooked by us internet geeks. These guys do actually have growth arcs, and most of the time us stat-nerds don’t know the specific issues a guy has to work on (laying off high fastballs, laying off low breaking balls, more consistent release point, etc..) and the organizations generally DO understand what it is their guys need to work on.
I agree that 90% of the time (might be hyperbolic, but I don’t really think so) when a team keeps a glam ’spect down on the farm, while he’s bashing a 1.000 OPS, they’re just beating him into line. But there really are times when a guy like Tui needs to finish a significant alteration to his approach in order to fulfill his potential. And there’s NO WAY he could work on that stuff if he knew that each and every move was on national television being critiqued by people like you and me.
July 31st, 2008 at 10:43 pm Quote
We have Victor Diaz, Craig Wilson, Tug Hulett, to name a few, that we won’t be concerned much about their arc. I’d prefer anyone of these three guys (and their equivalents) than Vidro.
August 1st, 2008 at 12:57 am Quote
Oh hey, I’m the first guy on the Diaz/Wilson/Hulett bandwagon, don’t get me wrong.
I was just pointing out that we, as stat-nerds, really don’t give a lot of consideration to the notion of specific issues which a player needs to address before he can really have the type of success he is capable of. And for anyone but the truly elite players, these guys have to do every stinkin’ thing they are capable of in order to contribute at the big league level. One missed stage in development, and they’re maybe toast.
That said, I don’t think it ruins a guy to have him hit the wall at 90mph while on cruise control. It offers a wake-up call that some guys absolutely require in order to take their shortcomings seriously.
August 1st, 2008 at 1:39 am Quote
I think Wlad Balentien’s failure in May did him a world of good…he’s been a statistically better hitter in AAA since that trainwreck. I think Jose Vidro is slowing players down from learning how the big leagues work. Get Tui, Hulett, Wlad, etc back up here and let them learn by failing…it’s the best way.
August 1st, 2008 at 3:08 am Quote
That is certainly how Bavasi approached player development..push them until they crack, but ease up before they shatter and show them how to prevent that from happening in the future.
Most of the guys we bring in seem to be the type of people who will actually learn the overriding lesson from the situation, rather than just focusing on the mechanical/whatever changes they had to implement (pigeon-toe, weight shift vs. long stride, etc..).
I really did like that part of Bavasi’s approach to player development.
August 1st, 2008 at 3:52 am Quote
well I hope we don’t start getting gunshy just because a few guys came up and spectacularly failed the first tie (Clement, Wlad). It’s easy to forget considering how poorly they’re hitting at the big league level, but we do still have the pieces to build a line-up if e can get them cranking and deploy them with confidence.
At full potential, we can definitely build a team around:
RF) Ichiro
CF) Reed
2B) Triunfel
C) Clement
LF) Balentien
DH) Moore
3B) Lopez/Tui
1B) free agent
SS) Betancourt
And that’s not that far off.
August 1st, 2008 at 5:40 am Quote
Lakay wrote:
Hey, I am not suggesting the team go out of the way to ensure Vidro’s return. That’s not my point. My point is that whether it is Hulett, Wilson, Diaz or Vidro filling a hole, (with the assumption that they are going to stink and be gone in short order), it doesn’t MATTER much who is filling that hole during the interim period.
Vidro is no better as a lame duck DH than Wilson. But Wilson is no better than Vidro, either.
What I don’t comprehend is the focus on money for 2009, when it is UTTERLY IMPOSSIBLE for money to solve ANY of the Ms problems in 2009.
=============
As for the contention that the Ms are somehow “close” - I think this is akin to saying that Pittsburgh is close to contending - or KC. It’s just not true - and it ignores a boat load of undeniable facts about the current team.
1) YuBet — Free swinging 26-year-old, showing every sign of regressing. He’s on a pace to draw 9 walks this SEASON. His defensive usefullness has also been questioned. If he’s posting an 80 OPS+ and delivering good defense, yeah, he’s serviceable, (IF you get enough over-average production to overcome his lacks). But, as sub-70 OPS+ SS with average (or worse) defensive skills is NOT conducive to a winning team.
2) Reed - I’m a big fan of Reed and would LIKE for him to succeed. I think he’s a major plus defensively. But, offensively, he remains AT BEST a major question mark, at worst, another sub-average singles hitter. He’s got no isolated power to speak of, and ho-hum patience. But, after his quick start, his OPS+ is down to 78 and falling. This is while being platooned to keep his numbers inflated. I’m sorry, but if the guy cannot *platoon* to a 100 OPS+, then even with his defense, it becomes questionable as to whether he’s a net positive factor.
3) Clement/Wlad — to date NEITHER has shown any ability whatsoever to adjust to major league hitting. Will this come? Maybe. Maybe not. In any case, Wlad was NEVER projected to become an all-star, like AJ. Wlad has shown some good signs in AAA this season. But he’s ALSO shown some bad signs. His .897 OPS is built almost exclusively on a massive increase in HRs/ISO. Hitting on a 45-HR pace at AAA is nice, but his BA has dropped 20 points at the same time his HRs have jumped and his Ks have dropped. That is a very mixed bag of results.
Clement, on the other hand, saw a complete disconnect between his 2008 AAA performance and his major league performance. His Ks soared, every positive stat plunged, and he’s spent lots of time on the bench. In addition, his splits between catching versus DHing are beyond startling. His .826 OPS as a catcher (77 PAs) is thrilling to see - though the .233 BA offsets the 5 HRs a bit. But, his .269 OPS (58 PAs) — YES, that is OPS, not average, OBP or slugging — that’s all three combined — well, that raises an eyebrow.
Both data sets are too small to draw solid conclusions with. But, as a DH he whiffs a lot more often, and his contact is abysmal. This is why it is NOT a good idea to assume that players can simply shift to DH seamlessly. There are LOTS of players who simply are not atuned to the particulars of DHing. (This is just one of many reasons that I loathe the idea of Clement at DH).
4) Ichiro/Johjima — At age 34 and 32, each of these guys is ALREADY sitting on the edge of *EXPECTED* decline due to age. The fact that both are having significantly under expectation seasons does NOT bode well for the future. Both are signed for multiple years and big dollars, (considering their production). NEITHER is remotely moveable.
While everyone likes to point out that Ichiro is unique, and he doesn’t fall nicely into the pre-ordained production pools, why does this mean OPTIMISM should be the stock position? A statistical rogue is just that - a rogue. That means his career arc could be EITHER better or worse than the norm. There is speculation that his home-to-first speed is down, and that his IFH% could ALREADY be permanently compromised. If so, you can kiss the .350 BA days good bye. His ISO for his career is 101. His ISO for the past THREE seasons goes: 94, 80, 76. That was age 32 - 34. What can we expect from 35-37?
==================
I don’t like being negative, but here’s what I see …
A) Ichiro/Johjima absolutely DESTROY any chance of rebuilding quickly. At best, Ichiro holds on to his 2008 production for the rest of his contract. Best case for Johjima is that he becomes an 8 million-a-year backup catcher. If he continues starting, that can only mean Clement was a complete washout.
B) With Ibanez out (at his age, he’s done for anyway, so not a bad thing), and Beltre gone, too — the foundation Matt suggests has exactly two guys with a resume that says a 100 OPS+ is “likely”. That’s Ichiro and Lopez. NOBODY else on that list has shown anything in the bigs to suggest they can even climb to the minimalist standards of the all-civics lineup. Now, this is actually being kind to BOTH. Lopez is in his FIRST season carrying a 104 OPS+ into August. Ichiro, on the other hand is currently looking at finishing 2 of the 3 most recent seasons with an OPS+ under 110. The trends actually would indicate the Lopez is fast becoming the MORE likely of the two to continue producing.
In short — Jose Lopez AT THIS MOMENT appears to be the best hitter the Ms will have over the next 3-4 seasons.
For Matt’s concept to work, with the idea that the lineup will be competitive, then it is not a case of needing Clement OR Reed OR Wlad OR Tui to succeed. It requires that pretty much every one of them does. Given the Ms track record, (and the general sub 50% chance for specs to succeed from ANY organization), that’s the wildest of all fantasties. It’s simply not going to happen, because it is drastically beyond the bounds of probability.
Tampa had to acquire top specs for almost a decade before they managed to get enough producing at once to actually work. And that STILL required them to go out and land a few “failed” specs from other orgs, who happened to blossom in Tampa.
Believing that the Ms can rebuild a competitive team based on what is already in the cupboard isn’t just overly optimisitc. It makes “W”s view of how easy things were going to be in Ira q seem like dispair.
The Ms are in a division with two of the best run orgs in baseball. The Ms traded away their top spec for a 2-year rental on a fragile ace. They have signed the two players most likely to swoon to long-term deals.
The honest truth? I think the Ms are roughly seven (7) years away from the playoffs.
I’m sure I’ll get heat for that view. But, the team basically did the same thing that San Fran did during Bonds’ final years. They rolled the dice on what was a 2-3 year window where a ring might be possible, and dug a DEEP hole for the period after that failure. And belief that it CAN be fixed “quickly” is only likely to extend the misery.
It takes the Marlins 6 years to go fire-sale and then rebuild. But, they actually have valuable pieces to deal to pump up the prospect numbers to the point that the odds shift toward enough working out that a core CAN develop - and then FA or a key trade or two can plug the last holes. The Ms don’t have that luxury. Dealing Ibanez and Washburn is simply NOT the same as dealing Miguel Cabrerra, or Beckett or Burnett.
NOBODY knows which specs will pan out at this moment. Therefore, signing any FA to more than a single season is just foolish. Take two years - see which of the prospects pan out, which don’t, (and do whatever you can to acquire more specs — like those 1-year signings that Pittsburgh loves to deal at the deadline), and THEN hit the FA market.
As it stands now, while the farm is better than it was 4 years ago, the age mismanagement has ended up with the club in a “nearly” starting from scratch position once again.
August 1st, 2008 at 6:02 am Quote
Sandy…do you really see ZERO value in spending money to acquire some guys to build around? Really?? What about the value of watching a team in 2009 that is at least somewhat interesting. C’mon…it doesn’t matter whether we waste 8 million dollars on pure garbage or save that for a player who might be a Mariner for several years? What if the FA we get is pretty young? Are you saying we can’t build around Beltre? If we sign him to another extension…he won’t help a winner?
My point is…it’s always…ALWAYS bad to waste money on nothing. ALWAYS.
August 1st, 2008 at 8:17 am Quote
IMO,
The Beltre signing was just about the ONLY kind of long-term FA acquisition that makes some sense to START a rebuilding process. Why? Because he was still only 26 when the contract began. That means his decline phase was BEYOND his contract, so he had a legit shot at still being max-productive when the rest of the team was assembled.
The Sexson contract was dumb, precisely because it was designed such that Sexson was almost guaranteed to be entering his decline at exactly the time the rebuild was reaching completion. The fact he imploded a year or two ahead of schedule just illuminated that reality more clearly.
The basic reality that EVEYRONE in SABR land knows is that 27-32 is the production “sweet spot”. I object to BEGINNING a rebuild by throwing money at FAs, because the typical “fast” rebuild arc takes 4 seasons - and except in extreme rare cases, that guy you signed is either going to be walking, decline, or both when you’re done. Which begs the question - what was he accomplishing while he was there.
The only reason I’m ambivalent about Vidro in 2009, is because it would be the LAST contract year - which makes him no different than a 1-year pickup off the FA market. I’m not lobbying FOR Vidro - just saying that saving a little money in 2009 doesn’t actually mean anything in 2011 — not for a team with the financial setup of Seattle.
I specifically stated earlier that acquiring Tex to build around would be doing EXACTLY the same thing that Bavasi did in acquiring Sexson. Many screamed that Sexson was just the wrong “choice”, and the Delgado would’ve been great. They are just as wrong. Delgado was older to begin with, and sure enough, had shown the same PREDICTABLE production decline since 2005.
My point is that a big 4-5 year contract for a FA is in 90% of cases going to work as follows:
Years 1-2 : stellar production, while team is losing — and he’s getting paid the least.
Years 3-4 : declining production as rest of team improves - salary increases, (paying more for less).
Year 5 : Team is better off replacing aging, declining and expensive FA, rather than keep him around for the good years.
That begs the question - what good do he do during those 4 years?
A) He drained a bunch of money for a losing team. BAD
B) He blocked a position for potential surprise prospect. BAD
C) He might play well enough in years 1-2 to hurt draft position. BAD
========
And personally, I don’t see any value in watching a team that is “interesting” in 2009 if it means that in 2012 they’re going to be right back where they started, rebuilding from scratch again.
Bavasi’s plan:
Ichiro stays
Buy Sexson+Beltre for 4-5 years
Develop: Reed, Olivo, Lopez, YuBet, Felix, Clement, Snelling, Asdrubal, Foppert, Pineiro, Meche
Buy some league avg. FA pitchers for 3-4 years: (Washburn, Batista, Silva)
When the prospects come in, go get an ace pitcher from FA, (Bedard)
The problem with this approach is NOT in talent judgement. It is in the reality that the MAJORITY of prospects fail - and **NOBODY** knows which ones are going to succeed ahead of time. The odds may be better for Felix than Meche, but the truth is, it is largely a crap shoot. It is the uncertainty of which specs work out that makes STARTING with FAs a bad idea.
You don’t START the rebuild by signing Tex to a multi-year contract. You go and get him when you’re on the verge of breaking through. But you cannot do this if you’re still saddled with a 10-figure salary pinned to a declining property.
August 1st, 2008 at 9:25 am Quote
It is well worth noting that Clement has been getting unexpectedly poor results, given the rate with which he has been squaring up the ball. While his strikeout rate in the bigs has been terrible and clearly indicates that he has been struggling, it is also informative to see what is happening when he puts the ball in play. He currently has the HIGHEST line-drive rate for balls in play on the Mariners (data from fangraphs), yet has a BABIP of 0.205… LOWER that his line drive average of 0.215. That is crazy and isn’t very likely to stay. Even the poster child for bad luck last year, Richie Sexson, ran a BABIP of 0.217 against a line drive average of 0.149. Based on my recollection of average performance, hitters usually run a BABIP ~0.100 point above their line drive rate. So Clement should have a BABIP on the order of 0.320. Given his strike out rate, that would only generate a batting average of 0.240, but it wouldn’t be the disaster it currently is.
August 1st, 2008 at 1:18 pm Quote
Word. :- )
August 1st, 2008 at 2:06 pm Quote
It’s…ALIVE!!
August 1st, 2008 at 3:33 pm Quote
SABRMatt wrote:
THAT is HILARIOUS!
August 1st, 2008 at 4:59 pm Quote
I don’t know if you’re serious or not…LOL But I was hoping to get a laugh out of someone with it…:)
August 1st, 2008 at 5:59 pm Quote
LOLOL :- )
We’re going to get back to highway cruising speed amigos, if anybody still cares … in the meantime, thanks for holding down the fort as it were…
August 1st, 2008 at 8:11 pm Quote
We care. When going full guns by far and away the best baseball conversation in Seattle.
August 2nd, 2008 at 2:44 am Quote
Trust me Doc…we still care. There was a conversation about you over at MarinerCentral…i suggest you read it.
August 2nd, 2008 at 2:10 pm Quote
Matt, I really thought the reference to Young Frankenstein (or so I took it) was funny given that Doc always used to have a picture of it up on his original-look site.
Doc, hope things are all right in what must be a tough situation. We’ll be here when you come back!
August 2nd, 2008 at 4:55 pm Quote
Yes…that’s what I was going for. I remember the crazy-hair pic.
August 3rd, 2008 at 6:58 am Quote
SABRMatt wrote:
My point, Matt, is that it is just as - or perhaps MORE wasteful to throw money at a long-term FA signing. Was the money spent on Sexson useful? How about the money spent on Washburn? BOTH of those were long-term FA signings at the leading edge of a rebuilding cycle.
ONLY the Beltre signing could be defended as useful - primarily because Beltre was specifically outside the normal realm of FA signings — in that he was major league experienced, AND he was still young enough to be in prime when the cycle reached completion.
But, 90% (or more) of FAs are age 28 and up. THAT is what makes it so wasteful. Let’s say that Tex wins his ring this year and hits the market to win the big, long payday. He is GUARANTEED to be in decline by the time the Ms could assemble a complete team capable of going all the way.
Felix is young enough where throwing big bucks to keep him makes sense - but that’s retaining a home grown prospect - NOT fishing in the FA market.
I’m saying it’s no big deal to waste 8 million on a player for one year, when that money is going to have zero impact on what the team is 4 years down the line.
You are suggesting paying DRASTICALLY more for 3-4 years, while simultaneously guaranteeing that when it matters the team will be in a worse place (less flexible). What you suggest wastes 5-10 TIMES the amount I’m suggesting AND hurts in lots of places.
1) Waste BIG money during phase when winning isn’t realistic.
2) Specifically build to insure star player (to build around) is in decline when needed most.
3) If star is actually productive, primary interim impact will be to worsen draft selections.
Basically, think of it in these terms.
Which decision was MORE detrimental to the rebuilding of the Ms in the past 5 years?
A) Signing Richie Sexson long-term for big money.
B) Signing Everett to a 1-year contract where he stunk.
For two (pointless) seasons, Sexson was very productive. But, because of the contract length and money, when his production tanked, he became unmoveable. He became a detriment to actually doing any number of things that “might” have improved the team.
How about:
A) HoRam for 1 year.
B) Batista for 3 years.
Which one is more detrimental to rebuilding the team? HoRam is gone, and the spot and money are available to improve the team. Batista is on the roster, and the contract size and length both continue to make choices for the future more difficult.
There are screams to dump Washburn, (who has been far more productive this season). Why? To open up slots for prospect development. Well, the Batista contract is actually the one that is singularly MOST damaging (at the moment) in that regard. But, in truth, BOTH the Wash and Batista contracts harken back to that methodology of building via FA.
Wash and Batista and Bedard were all FA pickups based on a premise that *100%* of the targeted prospects were going to blossom brilliantly.
The build FIRST thru FA creates a better team quickly. But, there is a price for that earlier success. Bavasi DID build a team that improved for 3 straight seasons. And the 2007 season enhanced the illusion that the team was far closer to the brass ring than they actually were.
I railed about age management. Well, if you look objectively at the Bavasi signings, in most of the cases he got EARLY production out of the guys he signed. Two good years from Sexson. One good year from Vidro and Batista. But the deck is generally rigged against the FA poachers.
Detroit is suffering thru the death throes of Sheffield.
The Yankees suffered thru the death throes of Unit and Clemens.
You know why the Braves managed to win for so long? Because they basically REFUSED to live thru the death throes of fading stars until very recently, (and now, they are no longer on top). Oh, they’d bring in FAs — but they were good at getting 29-year-olds for 3 years, and then tossing them.
Of course, it’s not a perfect system - NOBODY always gets what they want. Sometimes, you HAVE to fill spots with older guys. But, when the Braves did this, it was for CHEAPER older guys. They turn Renteria into Jurjens. They dump Andruw, rather than be saddled with MORE of his decline than they already have been.
Does signing a big name FA to BEGIN rebuilding have zero value? No. It has NEGATIVE value. The basic truth is this — when you are a playoff team, then balancing the short-term and long-term variables is VERY tricky. But, when you are NOT a playoff team, then thinking short-term is just dumb. EVERY variable only need be looked at in relation to long-term success.
Signing Tex for 5 years at 17-20 million a year starting in 2009 — could the Ms do that? Sure. And that would likely PREVENT them from getting back to the playoffs in 4 years. The money would compromise getting FAs in 2011 and 2012. Tex would be entering his decline when the rest of the pieces would be arriving. In the short term, the club might win more games, (meaning worse draft picks). Blowing big money to go backwards is not in my playbook for a successful franchise.
August 3rd, 2008 at 9:14 am Quote
Seth Kolloen has a slightly tongue-in-cheek take on this very topic in the PI today. His premise: what if the GM chair had not been filled when Bavasi took over. What if the team has made no trades, no FA signings and only relied on the farm system and signing its own free agents.
It’s obviously unrealistic but an interesting theoritical exercise nonetheless. I guess it points that an activist GM that is always tinkering and making moves may not be the best thing.
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/baseball/373303_kolloen02.html