Great discussion 'round the M's blog-o-sphere, as usual, on Rauuuuul's defense. :- )
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=== Caveats and Quid Pro Quo's Dept. ===
1. Agree in spirit with the idea that a good amount of Rauuuuuul's offense needs to be 'adjusted' for runs he gives away on defense.
2. This applies even though the so-called "average" ML defense in LF is skewed by glove-only players you would never consider for your Opening Day starting lineup. Nobody wants to replace Raul Ibanez with Joey Gathright, but Gathright's defense makes Ibanez look worse compared to the "average."
That said, Raul costs runs even compared to a legitimate two-way LF starter.
3. Also, it is one of the strangest things about the Mariners, that they seem to love 'aesthetic' defense so dearly, and yet give Ibanez a total free pass for defense.The whole discussion is completely worthwhile.
4. D-O-V would not, repeat NOT, have Raul Ibanez playing in LF. D-O-V would have Raul at DH against right hand pitchers, Vidro as a deluxe #10 hitter a la Mark McLemore, with Raul providing flexibility with spot play at 1B and LF.
5. The defensive stats all agree that Raul is well below average, and most observers agree that he is at least below average.
6. Still, the D-stats all agreed that the Safeco Field Mike Cameron was historically great, and he wasn't. The park, the staff, and the circumstances can and do create illusions that persist across D-metric systems.
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=== 30 Runs With One Glove?! Somebody Blow My Head Off, Dept. ===
The one tennis groundstroke that I would volley back at leisurely pace would be….Does it make sense to you amigos that any LF, short of Akebono or Cecil Fielder, could cost his team 30+ runs?
David Pinto's Probabalistic Model of Range had Raul as having caught 224 balls in 2007, compared to 244 that he "should" have caught (had he been ML-average). So twenty (20) extra batted balls drop, according to PMR.
And those 20 balls are against an average that assumes that the PMR heroes, Joey Gathright (88 OPS+), Jose Cruz (86 OPS+), Jay Payton (74 OPS+) and Scott Hairston (life .299 OBP) are important standards of comparison for Raul Ibanez.
They are not important standards of comparison for Raul. The important standards of comparison are the left fielders who can hit a little bit. I mean, I could put Marcus Trufant in left field and make everybody else look like they were costing us 20 runs. That wouldn't be relevant, right?
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=== Sense of Proportion Dept. ===
FWIW — not much! — those 20 balls are 100% in line with what my eyes tell me. I'll go to a weekend series with you, and I'll bet you the tickets, that we see either zero (0) or one (1) batted ball fall in any kind of a gray area for left field. Most games, we won't see any ball land in any debatable zone for LF, much less see one land four feet out of Raul's reach.
I go to lots of games where no batted balls fall in a place where any outfielder could have made a difference. The idea that a poor defensive OF loses one catch every other game, to a Joey Gathright type, just doesn't jibe with the batted balls I watch in real games.
This is precisely the golden compass that Bill James always uses to zero in on the truth long before math Ph.D's ever found the right parsec: he uses good judgment.
My own judgment may be lousy. But after 35 years of watching baseball, I think if you back up, watch a game, and ask, "just how many times DOES a LF or RF fail to get to a ball?", you'll be surprised how seldom it is.
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=== Statistical Illusions Good and Bad Dept. ===
Yet this was precisely the weird logic that led blogs to rip the decision to let Mike Cameron go: I remember reading that Cameron chased down 80, repeat eighty, gappers per season that an average CF would not have gotten to.
Nowadays, of course, after watching Randy Winn post similar RF's to Cameron's, we realize that a lot of factors go into the numbers that a defender puts up… Cammy wasn't running down any 80 extra balls a year. And Raul isn't missing any 50 fewer balls per year than Jason Bay would get to in Safeco Field.
………………………….
So if Raul does indeed fail to get to 20 batted balls per season, what is that worth? Well, a single is worth about .5 runs, a double about .8 runs, and how many triples does Raul miss that somebody else would have caught? That's about 1 run per triple.
How does that add to 20-30 runs over the course of 130 defensive games?
It doesn't. In order to impute 20 or 30 runs lost to Raul Ibanez, you've got to figure that he's missing 40-50 balls per year that Jason Bay, Carlos Lee, Shannon Stewart and Alfonso Soriano would in fact catch, if they were playing in Safeco.
………………………….
I also simply can't believe the local wisdom that Raul is "a statue" in left field. If you actually take the trouble to watch Raul scoring from second on a single, you'll see the guy runs quite well. He's fast. I don't know where the myth came from that he plods around like Richie Sexson out there; he looks fast and he is fast.
Now it is very true that Raul gets terrible jumps, and it is true that he does not accelerate quickly, not compared to Carl Crawford. Compared to Reggie Willits, Raul gives away 2-3 strides over the course of a gapper.
Compared to a MOTO hitter in left, Carlos Lee or Garret Anderson, much less a Kevin Mench or Pat Burrell, Raul doesn't give away any mobility worth talking about.
………………………….
I'm not dogmatic about it.
I could (easily) be wrong. Maybe the concern over Raul's defense is not overstated at all. On this one I don't have the topic surrounded. :- )
I'm interested in a well-reasoned response to this post that does convince me that Raul is -30 runs with the glove, and I wouldn't be surprised to see one.
But defensive stats — though they all agree Raul is well below average — are inconsistent and unconvincing. Weird things, like Jose Cruz Jr. having historically-great defensive stats in 2007, can and do happen in the stats.
If and only if Adam Jones is the point of reference, Raul probably does cost the Mariners very significant defense. And it is to the Mariners' discredit that they read the "inexperience" card to believe that Jones couldn't play defense as well as Raul in 2006.
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But with everybody else in the world certain that Raul Ibanez costs 20 or 30 defensive runs per year, D-O-V is offering a voice in the wilderness on the other side. :- )
I'm not a Raul fan, particularly. I don't want him playing LF for the Mariners, particularly. But I do suspect that Raul Ibanez is a lot closer to Bay, Stewart, Lee, Holliday and Catalonotto than you think he is. I believe that the stats suggesting Raul costs 30 runs per season are as misleading as the ones that suggested Mike Cameron was getting us 80 catches a season beyond what Randy Winn would get.
The Mariners have better D-stats than we do. And I suspect that these proprietary D-stats tell them the same thing: that Raul's defense is no big deal in LF.
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=== Dr's Prescription, Dept. ===
As a left fielder, Raul would make one whale of a platoon DH. :- )
This isn't a team full of dominating players. Its strength is now its depth. It is high time for this ballclub to adopt an Oakland A's-style job-sharing lineup.
The A's manage egotistical ballplayers too. They tell the ballplayers that winning is more important than egos, take it or leave it.
Cheers,
Dr D
November 17th, 2007 at 6:13 pm Quote
The idea of perspective, of proportion, is one that gains little traction in sabermetrics, it seems.
There is so much emphasis on “scientific” approaches that a 30,000-foot view finds little room. This is ironic, since little of sabermetrics is scientific in the strict sense anyway. If we were wrong about something, it’s not like we would tell ourselves so. :- )
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James and co. bring up the idea of proportion, through a reverse-engineering concept like Win Shares … and many analysts blink, stare blankly, quibble with this or that alleged flaw in it, and return to staring at the regression-analysis trees from a few feet away. “Common sense” in the sabermetric arena usually involves thinking from a reverse-engineering standpoint. However, this is very unpopular because it involves intuition rather than advanced math.
Of course, when you cannot “capture” all of the variables in a real-life problem, it is precisely intuition that allows human beings to understand life better than an algorithm could.
…………………
The difference between an average run-prevention unit (KC, NYY 2007) and a terrible one (Baltimore 2007) was … wait for it … 90 runs.
If Baltimore as a ballclub gave up 90 runs more than New York, was any of that was due to the differences between Wang and Cabrera, between Clemens and Olsen?
No matter how much you love defense, you’ve got to put >50% (actually >65%) of run prevention onto the guy out there who is falling behind 2-0 or who is striking people out.
So if you have 90-170 runs difference between a typical team and a team that is a joke, and most of that is due to the pitchers, how much difference is one defender making?
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And the left fielder has fewer balls hit at him* than any other defender on the diamond.
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Baseball managers from John McGraw to Earl Weaver to Tony LaRussa have figured, if you have a 40-homer guy with a meathook for a glove :- ) then he doesn’t hurt you much in LF, in RF or at 1B. Those guys aren’t going to hesitate to put a 38-year-old Larry Walker in the outfield if he can rake.
GREAT managers, as a group, have just never worried much about defense in LF or at 1B. If we have any humility, that should give us pause. It doesn’t mean they had the gospel truth, but it’s something that we should think about.
I am 100% sure it is because of the reasoning above: it’s the pitchers who matter, and the defenders in the middle of the field who help them out significantly. That’s been the almost unanimous opinion among GREAT managers for over 100 years, and in this case it’s a consensus that I’m pretty sure is accurate.
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21st-century neosabes might be right that you need a quality glove in LF, but I doubt it.
November 17th, 2007 at 6:37 pm Quote
The only thing I can think of is the fact that the Safeco’s LF will be more important than the typical neutral park, simply by virtue that it is larger than the norm.
But even then, it’s hard to imagine 3 games (10 runs is about 1 game, right?… Haven’t stayed on the saber wagon lately) going out the door with an Ibanez v. a magical vacuum cleaner.
November 17th, 2007 at 6:48 pm Quote
Agreed with Ice…Safeco’s LF is a premium defensive postion. Its large and the wind blows in from LF-CF creating more oppurtunities.
I’d be suprised if Ibanez cost 30 runs a year with his glove, but 15-20 runs a year at Safeco seems reasonable.
You’d save significant runs defensively just swapping Ibanez for Adam Jones…but Mr.Bavasi doesn’t seem to agree.
Ibanez can be the platoon DH..Carlos Quentin is available from Arizona, and his stock is never going to be lower.
November 17th, 2007 at 7:42 pm Quote
Just for the statistical record, a completely marginal left fielder (that is, the left fielder on a .250 W% outfield) is worth 1.6 wins fewer than an average left fielder. That’s 14 runs or so…about -25 batted balls. That makes Raul Ibanez a left fielder ABOVE margin…meaning his defense adds about 0.2-0.5 (depending on the year and Raul’s health) wins above a marginal left fielder. In other words…Raul Ibanez is a great example of why people who fixate on average-centric metrics (like FRAA or +/- or PMR) are going to constantly make really really bizarre conclusions about players. His defense adds wins to the Mariners…it does not subtract them. He adds fewer wins than your average left fielder, but not enough that playing Ibby in left field is going to be a catastrophe.
I would also note that Ibanez was a “statue” last year and last year only…before that he was an average fielder and the difference might be partially injury related. A healthier Ibanez might look less inept than the blog-o-sphere recalls from ‘07.
November 17th, 2007 at 8:35 pm Quote
Ya, no doubt that glovework would be *more* important in a bigger park. Taking the reductio ad absurdum, if the fences were 250 feet then the OF’s would hardly matter at all.
How much more, I dunno.
Certainly we all would like to see good defense out there, and the 2001 M’s typically had quality OF’s at all three positions…
November 17th, 2007 at 8:39 pm Quote
More important than other LF’s, yes, probably. That *sounds* reasonable. And this effect could be getting measured by Pinto’s PMR, which attributes -20 catches to Raul over the course of 130 games (65 at home).
IOW, Raul seems moderately below average with the glove to me … PMR has him at the very bottom of the lists (not counting Manny LOL), and I’m sure this is Safeco amplifying Raul’s moderate negative impact.
……………………..
But is the most important LF in the majors, anywhere near as important as the least important CF in the majors?
And Oakland will put Snelling or Swisher in CF if that’s the best way to attack the pitcher that day. Swisher played 59 games in center for Oakland this year.
One thing I like about Oakland, is that they’re not bound by 2-dimensional paradigms. They seem very alert to the complexity of every baseball problem.
November 17th, 2007 at 8:39 pm Quote
#4 - Excellent post as usual Matty. ::daps::
November 17th, 2007 at 8:49 pm Quote
The best left fielder is worth more wins than the worst center fielder, yes. But no matter how large the Safeco park factor, it can’t possibly be large enough make left field more important at some stadiums than center field is at others. Park factors for defense are probably on the order of +/- 0.3 R/G/Side for all of the positions…for an individual position, it’s fair to guess that the range is more like +/- 0.1 R/G/Side in the most extreme cases which would be 8.1 runs for the games you play at that park and you’d be giving a few of those back when you play your other 81 games at parks that average out to being on the other side of the park factor spectrum. Net park adjustments for any given position should never be larger than 5 runs…TOPS…and the average CF is worth 30 marginal runs whereas the average LF is worth 18 marginal runs. Even if the most extreme park factors for CF and LF were applied…CF would still come out more important.
November 17th, 2007 at 8:51 pm Quote
This is an interesting point :- )
Online, when Bavasi is not present, blogs are free to poke fun at Bavasi, assume that he doesn’t know what he’s doing, etc.
When Bavasi actually is in the same room with his critics, from the best that I can tell, the tone is very different and Bavasi’s command of the game evokes a lot of deference…
Supposing we were in the same room with Bavasi. Supposing we asked him why he doesn’t agree, why he doesn’t think Raul is a net disaster in LF, why do you suppose he thinks that?
November 17th, 2007 at 8:52 pm Quote
#8 … another interesting follow-on :- )
November 17th, 2007 at 10:18 pm Quote
I don’t have anything coherent to add, so I’m going with bulletpoints:
- before this season, Ibanez’ PECOTA Speed Score (so an average of the previous three seasons with 2006 weighted more heavily) placed him right at the 60 percentile among major leaguers so even if he lost a lot of footspeed this year due to injuries he wasn’t a sloth
- despite this, it is now a universal truth among the blogosphere that he is indeed a sloth. It clearly has become fashionable to bash him and that has grossly distorted how his defense is perceived. For proof, just check out how the fans rated him in Tango’s survey. He had an average speed rating of 17 (max 100, average of 50) which would make him one of the absolute slowest players in the game. That certainly isn’t the case so Dr. D’s plea for perspective is appropriate
- I’ve only gotten more frustrated with defensive metrics as time has gone on. Bill James said something to the effect of “a statistic that is accurate 70% of the time is useless since you don’t know when it is wrong”. That sentiment applies perfectly to the current crop of defensive measurements and it is why I am still waiting for the Holy Grail for rating player’s glove work
- Matt’s point about Raul being maybe 5 runs better than the margin seems trivial. That would still put him roughly a couple of wins below an average fielder. Messing with the baseline doesn’t change the relative value between full time players, it only matters when looking at guys with different playing time
November 17th, 2007 at 10:50 pm Quote
Tango’s survey is a great way to see how the Mariner fans views have been warped by Cameron and Sullivan’s disparagement of Ibanez. Take a look at how his speed has been rated the last three years:
2005- 44
2006- 31
2007- 17
That means the popular perception went from considering him basically an average runner to a cripple in two years. Some decline was warranted, but this is absurd. They consider him as fast as Sexson now, even though Raul had 5 triples this year while Big Sexy has 5 triples total in the last 6 seasons! It gets worse, take a look at how the fans rated his arm strength:
2005- 47
2006- 43
2007- 26
The Ibanez bashing has gotten so great that the fans have a more negative view of every facet of his game. Raul had 10 assists this year in 131 games compared 11 (his career high) in 2006 playing in 157 games. Barring a serious injury, there is no reason for a player’s strength to decline in a short period of time yet the consensus is that Ibanez now has a noodle arm. That is irrational.
November 17th, 2007 at 11:34 pm Quote
Well done CBP.
On the 0-100 scale, I would not give Ibanez a 17 (!) speed score…he would get about a 40. And on a 0-100 scale, he would get a 50 from me for arm…he’s got a slightly below average arm strength and a well above average arm accuracy, which averages him out to an average arm presence.
BTW, you’re wrong about where I put Ibanez in my post. I placed him at 5-8 runs above the Margin in 2007, yes, but that’s not TWO wins below average…that’s ONE win below average. The average is 1.7 wins and I placed him at about 0.5 wins give or take a few.
November 17th, 2007 at 11:50 pm Quote
The survey rates release, strength and accuracy separately so the numbers I gave relate specifically to strength which is why I found it so appalling.
So you’re basically just rating him better than the other metrics, which is a completely separate issue from whether or not he is above the margin.
November 18th, 2007 at 12:45 am Quote
Actually…no…PMR rates Ibanez as -20 plays to average which is about -12 runs to average which is the same as the number I got. I was saying looking at average-based metrics is bad because it distorts your perspective on what has value. 150 games of average play in left field has a lot of value…a lot more than zero anyway. When people at USSM say that Ibanez is “giving away runs on defense”…they’re (unknowingly) lying to us. He’s not giving away runs…he’s still contributing positive value toward the winning of baseball…he’s just not contributing as much value as the average left fielder would. They aren’t incorrect in the numbers they list…just in the conclusions they draw from those numbers. They will argue something like “Ibanez is +20 runs on offense in 2008, optimistically, but he gives back all 20 of those runs on defense, so he has no value.” The misstep is not in reaching the zero in their calculations, but assigning zero value to it. Of course, we’re also pointing out in this thread that Ibanez isn’t 20 runs below average defensively and never has been, but I get tired of people acting like being average for a left fielder makes you valueless…”the Mariners can’t afford to carry Ibanez in left field…he’s average once you factor in defense which makes him a bad choice.” World Champions carry lots of average players. The difference between the Mariners and a world championship team is: we still have a sucking chest wound at SP5 and 2B instead of average players and a world champion would have at least three impact players, but the Mariners have only one (Ichiro).
November 18th, 2007 at 12:49 am Quote
Although Ibanez isn’t as bad as guys like Dave USSM have made him out to be, I still think he is a liability (not fast, bad jumps, bad routes). It just doesn’t seem neccesary to keep in LF at Safeco when you have a better alternative in house (Jones).
I can understand the argument of keeping Ibanez in the outfield if you can’t find a better alternative. What I DON’T understand is why you’d keep Ibanez in LF and Jones in RF (Bavasi’s plan).
November 18th, 2007 at 1:16 am Quote
mainly because Ibanez has played LF and not RF (much) and because it’s “common knowledge” that you want your RFer to have a strong arm. There’s nothing more to it than that I suspect. Which is lame and frustrating, but…that’s how it is.
November 18th, 2007 at 1:17 am Quote
My impression of Bavasi is that hes charismatic, commands respect, and is great with people.. He seems like a natural leader…that combined with the fact that his father was a GM probably has a lot to do with his position in the game today.
That said, when it comes to evaluating baseball players, I think hes completely lost..I really do. Theres never been an instance when Bavasi has said anything profound (I can’t remember anything hes said thats really broadened my knowledge), and his moves as a GM have been mind-boggling at times..
He seems like a good person, but I really wish he wasn’t my favorite team’s GM.
November 18th, 2007 at 2:04 am Quote
There’s a pretty good take on the effect of Raul’s defense here: Yesterday’s Pants
November 18th, 2007 at 7:09 am Quote
Matt, may I parse your arguments into this?
Average = (Manny Ramirez + Ted Williams’ Frozen Corpse in LF + Grady Sizemore in LF + Tractor Beam Equipped Ichiro in LF)/4
Marginal = Line of Utter Abysmalness * Spectacular Suckage = Something Like No LFer = Black Hole
And…
Marginal < Raul Ibañez < Average
So…
Raul Ibañez = Suck = Bad Choice for LF ≠ Black Hole
At least, that’s what I got when I didn’t read the numbers and stat hooey gooey.
November 18th, 2007 at 10:04 am Quote
More or less IceX.
Actually Manny Ramirez is submarginal…the margin is a higher standard than “no left fielder” or “Manny Ramirez”…it’s roughly in line with Manny Ramirez circa 2002.
Ibanez is better than that, but not by a huge amount. He’s not the Mariners best choice for LF…if they would have shown any interest in Fukudome, I’d have liked to haave seen Jones in left, Fukudome in right, Ibanez DHing and Vidro a supersub at 5 positions (DH, 1B, 2B, LF (move Ibanez to outfield DH Vidro), and RF (same deal). But…I don’t make the decisions.
November 19th, 2007 at 1:12 am Quote
I scratch my head about this a bit. I remember when Raul was just a newbie, and Lou used him mainly as a defensive replacement late in games. He didn’t get played more, because his bat wasn’t up to snuff. Now I know players can experience sharp declines in defensive ability - Andruw Jones and Roberto Alomar come to mind at the moment - but are his jumps, routes, and speed that much worse than when he was called up? And if he’s a step slower now, wouldn’t his experience help him in anticipating batted balls and reduce bonehead throwing errors and such?
I also have to disagree that Jones is unquestionably the defensive wizard in the outfield everyone seems to be making him out to be. In his limited experience in the M’s outfield, he has posted a fielding percentage significantly lower than league average. Agreed that he’ll likely be an above-average outfielder; and that there’s a good chance he’s up in Torii Hunter-Mike Cameron type of ability. But the errors he’s made are real ones, and I think we can expect him to continue to be prone to youthful mistakes for a year or two.
November 19th, 2007 at 3:59 am Quote
Fielding percentage is weak measurement of the player’s skill, so it doesn’t do well to project production using it.
Due to the extremely opinion-driven and judgement basis of the error, they aren’t awarded consistently nor with any particular specification in mind. For instance, if a player knocks down a ball that is nearly undefendable, but manages to look like an idiot while doing it, its gonna gain an error. On the flip side, I could play SS for an MLB team and rack up zero errors by virtue of the fact that I simply couldn’t reach 90% of the balls hit towards me. I’d still look like I’m defending the position and get a gold glove if I played in Tampa Bay or Pittsburgh or some other team no one pays attention to, but I’d be doing a pretty awful job of it.
So, in essence, the debate goes to whether Adam Jones is bungling plays that most fielders couldn’t play or whether he is just bungling the basic plays.
November 19th, 2007 at 8:13 am Quote
Most of the LF stuff has already been said, so I’m going to shine a light on one item the good Dr. brought up:
This is, IMO, one of the most important items to understand, which is SCALE. And it’s a scale that I suspect even most statheads wouldn’t be able to identify by intuition. If asked the question, I suspect almost no one could say with any certainty what the “typical” runs allowed difference is between the best and worst teams in the AL each season. The round number answer is 300.
That’s a starting point, only. But it’s about the only one that would be completely indisputable. I think most people understand the basic problem AFTER that is properly apportioning credit/blame between pitchers and fielders for those runs allowed.
Above is stated the belief that “at least” half of the credit should go to the pitchers. I disagree. The simplest, easiest defensive stat to count is outs. In modern baseball, pitchers generate roughly 7 strikeouts per game. That’s actually just a bit over 25% of all outs. So, the ’starting’ point for pitcher credit would have to begin here. It might get larger, but definitely shouldn’t get any smaller. The simple truth is that if approximately 3/4 of all outs involve fielders, then it gets difficult quickly to start sloshing credit for those outs back to the pitchers.
But even with a substantially aggressive starting point which assigns fielding as 3/4 of defensive importance, from best to worst in the AL is going to be at most 220-230 runs at the team level. If you simply divide by 9, that means each defensive position from BEST to WORST swings about 25 runs. Yes, this is a gross oversimplification, because we know that all positions are not as important - they don’t get the same number of chances. But the key here is to FIRST wrap the mind around what the actual swing top-to-bottom happens to be.
Fans, who had followed baseball all their lives, get a feel for what relative value between .270 and .300 hitters. They learn and understand that production varies from season to season, but know ‘in general’ what to expect from players offensively. But pitching and defense have been relegated to simply error counting for so long, the basic foundation blocks of skew from top to bottom are simply not known by fans, (and many statheads).
Dr.D does a great service by trying to point us toward the concept of scale. What is the general “possible” skew in runs allowed at a position is a good question. And while sabremetrics has many different forumlae attempting to answer that question, as yet, we don’t have a generally accepted one.
But if a ’straight average’ method tells us best-to-worst swing in runs allowed is in the arena of 25 runs - then after we adjust for the clearly more active defensive positions, (SS, 2B, CF), and the least active (pitching/catching - exluding strikeouts, of course), then over 162 games, maybe a LF can cost his team 20-25 runs compared to the best defensive player, (or save them same compared to the worst).
Such an approach is incredibly simplistic, yes. But I think it at least sets the stage for putting defensive prowess in SOME kind of context. Then again, left field is complicated by the fact that there really aren’t many FULL TIME LFs in baseball these days.
November 19th, 2007 at 11:40 am Quote
The problem with this approach Sandy is that a significant amount of averaging between good, bad, and indifferent defensive PLAYERS occurs in these TEAM averages. So if the difference between the best and worst teams is 200 runs, or 20-25 runs per position, why is it unreasonable to expect that the averaging involved in your method doesn’t suppress the range for the best to the worst PLAYERs by a factor of 2? This gets us to the range of a gold glove player buying you 20-25 runs and a butcher costing you 20-25, or the range we are discussing.
November 19th, 2007 at 12:02 pm Quote
I believe that the great center fielders and middle infielders are capable of saving a team 50-60 runs in a season relative to the margin (or about 35-40 runs compared to average) but the gap between average and sucky is smaller (because teams don’t tolerate submarginal defense and those players are quickly moved to DH or replaced).
November 19th, 2007 at 12:29 pm Quote
Kelly, I get what you’re saying - and I’m certainly not suggesting that my approach is “the” answer - just a starting point.
As a matter of logic, it stands to reason that the WORST defensive team is going to have multiple poor defenders. Of course, as you note, this doesn’t mean they can’t have some average or even above average defenders in the mix.
So, the question I would ask: “Is it possible to have the 9 best (or worst) gloves (at their position) in the game wind up on the same team?” I suspect that the odds of this happening are actually higher than one might think. Why? Because defensive metrics have always been lacking - making it very subjective as to this reality - meaning, it could have happened, even multiple times, and nobody would have known.
But the mindset of defensive importance is not a constant among organizations. MANY organizations have “personnas”, which may include (or preclude) defensive prowess as a major focus. When looking at the extremes - to GET to the extremes, it requires a team effort. It is easy to spot it on the offensive side: The Yankees lead in runs in 2007, and have one starting position with an OPS+ of under 107.
The further from center you get, the less likely you are to have “much” leveling impact. It is unlikely that the worst defensive team is made up of 6 average defenders and two guys who are solely responsible for 150 run skew from average.
November 19th, 2007 at 12:44 pm Quote
While what you’re saying sounds reasonable, my concern is that if Ibanez isn’t a complete disaster in LF, what’s going into the Mariners being among the worst defenses in the league? We can quibble about an individual defender’s value and how well it’s represented in defensive metrics, but team defense is much more precise.
Since we know CF and 3B are well above average, and SS and 2B grade out at about average (though I still believe Yuni can be much better than that), then where is the incredible defensive shortcoming emanating from? It gives us three options: LF, RF, and 1B. Those three positions took a net above average defense at the other positions down into among the worst in the league. Even if Ibanez isn’t any worse than Guillen and Sexson is the biggest part of the problem (not great assumptions in my opinion), this is still a very, very big deal.
If we had pitchers who could strike more people out, maybe we wouldn’t have to worry so much. But we don’t, and I don’t see them showing up anywhere. Based on that, I think starting the year with Ibanez in left would be catastrophically stupid. OK, maybe not catastrophically, but inexcusably.
As for how this is showing up in Tango’s report, I think what you’re saying, Papa Bell, is probably accurate to some degree. But we should also include the possibility that fans’ eyes weren’t telling them what they need to know before and that even an overreaction may be closer to the truth than we might want to admit, particularly since he has undoubtedly been slowing during that time (if, clearly, not as much as the reports indicate).
November 19th, 2007 at 2:05 pm Quote
Maybe my statement that Ibanez is a statue in the field was a little excessive but it did look to me that his lateral movement was seriously degraded in 2007 and his first step was very slow. Ibanez is at at age where Michael Jordan’s rule is going to be coming into effect here: when the legs go, for most athletes they go fast.
Regarding the rest of the thread, I don’t find comparative analysis all that useful when the comparison is to some mythical “league average” player. What I would find useful is Doc or Matt or Sandy’s analysis of the impact that replacing Raul in LF with Jenkins or Fukudome or one of the other $8-$10 million options would do for the team.
Part of USSM’s analysis that has been lost in the shuffle, I think, is their Moneyball argument that reducing runs through acquiring pitchers is expensive, while making the same improvement through acquiring defense is not. If Weaver, Kuroda, Jenkins and Fukudome all cost you $8 million, which $8 million gives you the best bang for your buck?
November 19th, 2007 at 2:14 pm Quote
Some Seattle numbers (compared to league average — plus means good minus means bad).
Statistic –: Avg. - SEA
Runs allowed: 781 — 813 (-32)
Strikeouts : 1064 - 1020 (-44)
BasesonBalls: 531 — 546 (-17)
Home Runs –: 161 — 147 (+14)
DER (median):.693 - .678 (-15) - (27th in baseball)
Individual RF and ZR scored (qualifiers only in AL)
POS:- RF — ZR — TopRF - BotRF - TopZR - BotZR - MedZR
1B : 9.73 - .766 - 10.75 - 8.73 — .918 - .766* - .842
2B : 5.14 - .837 - 5.69 — 4.60 — .887 - .806 — .846
3B : 2.87 - .766 - 2.90 — 2.38 — .803 - .737 — .770
SS : 4.66 - .802 - 4.74 — 4.02 — .843 - .765 — .804
LF : 1.89 - .761 - 2.33 — 1.72 — .934 - .713 — .824
CF : 2.90 - .867 - 3.07 — 2.29 — .916 - .851 — .883
RF : 1.96 - .794 - 2.62 — 1.82 — .908 - .794* - .851
The numbers actually paint the Seattle pitching staff as pretty close to average. A few more walks, a minor shortfall in Ks, but a significant plus in HRs. The K/HR numbers mean the team got about 30 extra balls in play than average.
First note: RF (Guillen) and 1B (Sexson) eached ranked last among AL qualifiers.
Second note: As Matt noted, the ‘juicy’ defensive positions carry a league-wide higher concern, so the RANGE for second, short and center is much smaller. BUT, these positions also get far more chances.
Third note: CF - the “perception” was held strongly that Ichiro was a plus+ CF, (and early on, the stats supported this - albeit with a small sample size). But his final, season long numbers aren’t as sweet. He did tie Granderson for most POs. But, he played 50 more innings than Granderson. His .867 Z-rating actually ends up being the second WORST Z-rating of any qualifying CF in the AL, (9th of 10).
Mind you, I take my Z-ratings with a grain of salt. I expect ANY CF with more than 400 POs is likely a superior fielder. But the truth of the matter is that the numbers say that Ichiro “may” not have been as good as perceived.
FINAL NOTE: If you examine the Z-ratings for the Seattle defenders, one discovers that *ZERO* were rated above the median value for their position. A number were pretty close to median - but the basic exercise is to open the door to the idea that the perception of defensive prowess on an individual level may be suspect.
I have been trumpeting the concept that POSITIONING is the #1 factor for defenders, NOT athleticism. Getting fielders and pitchers on the same defensive page can reap huge dividends. I don’t believe Seattle’s defensive problems in 2007 were a result of fielders lacking skill. I believe the club was simply horrible at positioning its players. Why they dropped so badly from 2006 (13th) to 2007 (26th), I do not know. My guess would be that SOMEONE behind the scenes that was integral to these decisions changed.
But the plus for Seattle in 2008 is this. DEFENSE is probably the #1 arena where a team can make a massive swing without investing massive dollars. Go look at the Boston DER from 2006 to 2007. They changed their defense up the middle, and went from near bottom to near top in DER. The difficult part is correctly identifying the problem before heading toward solution.
November 19th, 2007 at 2:57 pm Quote
I would submit that the Mariners don’t need to change 2B and SS to get more bang for their buck defensively. Lopez and Betancourt are both capable of being good to great fielders if they are positioned properly. The team can be a good fielding team with Ibanez in left if Adam Jones, Yubet and Lopez start learning how to be smarter preparing for plays.
November 19th, 2007 at 2:58 pm Quote
BTW Sandy, the fact that all of the Z-Ratings for the Mariners were low including Ichiro and Beltre should tell you that not only are the Mariners not positioning themselves well, but the pitchers are getting a lot of hard hit BIP too.
November 19th, 2007 at 3:05 pm Quote
“I have been trumpeting the concept that POSITIONING is the #1 factor for defenders, NOT athleticism.”
There’s some support for this in THT’s fielding stats - their +/- stat shows the M’s are well below average in both the infield and outfield, and yet both groups have a higher than average number of ‘out of zone’ plays. Even Raul seems above average in OOZ plays, though not nearly as much as Ichiro. The M’s don’t seem to be positioned anything like a ‘normal’ team, and the results of that positioning have not been pretty.
I think Sandy basically said it jw, but from a purely statistical point of view, Yuniesky hasn’t been average - he’s *really* pulling down the M’s DER. Now, how much of this is positioning and how much is something else? I don’t know. I just think it’s concerning…
November 19th, 2007 at 3:42 pm Quote
That’s interesting…that the Mariners are a bad fielding team full of great fielders (measured by the OOZ plays). That is a huge indictment of Mike Hargrove and possible John McLaren too.
November 19th, 2007 at 5:02 pm Quote
A point brought up by DrNaka on this site earlier this year, that the positioning may be at the root of the M’s defensive problems.
November 19th, 2007 at 5:08 pm Quote
Oh yeah… an entire post about it, courtesy of SABRMAtt, Sandy, DrNaka & Dr. D. That’s a good one.
November 20th, 2007 at 12:53 am Quote
Ah, the ’statue’ label wasn’t your invention Grizzle :- ) and would agree all the way about the first step…
Good thread. Raul’s cost factor on D makes for poor ridicule fodder, but does make for excellent discussion. I’m not fond of the jeer-and-pile-on-and-then-hurl-yourself-on-top-again dance step the M’s blog-o-sphere has patented, but do think the case against Raul’s glove is very interesting.
…………………..
We’ve all seen some genuinely immobile OF’s in our time — I grew up watching Greg Luzinski, LOL — and Raul ain’t immobile, no way no how. But he is a stiff mechanical outfielder, definitely.
November 20th, 2007 at 2:29 am Quote
More so last year not because of age but because of injury. Now it’s possible that he will continue to be hurt a lot since injuries do swarm more often in older players, but last year he has hip problems, elbow problems, shoulder problems, back spasms and foot/ankle pain.
November 20th, 2007 at 7:36 am Quote
One possible contributing factor to the possibility that the M’s net team D is worse than the sum of its parts (if I understand your points) would be pitchers’ command, which is pretty bad for the M’s. This is compounded by the relative lack of SO’s by the staff. My vote has always been for heavy emphasis on the K as a pitching strategy. Not that the other way can’t work, it just allows more opportunity for mistakes. Fielders not seeming to be positioned correctly can be skewed by the fact that the gameplan stated that Washburn was pitch a particular batter hard and away, but the reality is that he missed towards the middle with an off-speed pitch, for example.
November 20th, 2007 at 7:37 am Quote
39- “Washburn was TO pitch, ” sorry
November 20th, 2007 at 8:58 am Quote
Here’s a little surprise from 2007 AL.
League leader in team Ks: Tampa Bay. (1194) - (Seattle had 1020 - league average about 1050).
League *WORST* team in DER: Tampa Bay. (.662) - (Seattle at .678 ranked 27th among all ML teams).
Tampa, Seattle, KC, Anaheim and WhiteSox all had more Ks than the leage worst in team Ks, (Texas). Yet, Texas ranked above ALL of these teams in DER.
While I am willing to consider the concept that a given pitching staff allows balls to be hit harder than another, thereby creating a different paradigm for defenses, the truth is that there seems to be little or no correlation between team strikeouts and team DER. Additionally, if pitchers ARE allowing more balls to be hit hard, then one would expect more HRs to be hit.
SEA 2006 - 1067-K; 183-HR; 1500-H; 1446-IP; DER (.698 - 13th)
SEA 2007 - 1020-K; 147-HR; 1578-H; 1434-IP; DER (.678 - 27th)
47 fewer Ks, with 36 fewer HRs, but 78 more hits in 12 fewer innings. This isn’t a picture that supports the notion that the blame for the horrid DER is pitcher-centric. And the evidence directly contradicts the notion that high K totals guarantee better defense. There were three pitchers who had 190-193 innings. Here are their innings, K totals and hits allowed totals:
IP — SO — hits
193 - 114 - 201
193 - 133 - 209
190 - 165 - 209
The guy with the FEWEST Ks had the best defense.
The guy with the MOST Ks had the worst defense.
===========
I wasn’t aware of the Out-of-zone stats, but that definitely is supporting data to the concept that the team was positioned poorly.
November 20th, 2007 at 9:48 am Quote
Any data on how Riggleman’s teams did defensively that might offer some hope that he will help upgrade the positioning issue?
November 20th, 2007 at 1:13 pm Quote
I really am glad that it was pointed out earlier in the year just how much potential impae defensive positioning can have on a team’s toal defensive contributions. I’d never really thought that at this level of play, positioning would be such a huge factor.
I hope the M’s FO has people that peek in on these threads from time to time (if they don’t, they’re inept and not tech-savvy), so we can only hope that this is something which is being addressed. It’s plainly obvious that we have gobs of defensive talent on the field at any given time, just like it’s plainly obvious that Jose Lopez is capable of consistently hitting a ball 375′ to LF if allowed to consistently pull the ball. We can only hope that deployment improves during the next campaign.
November 20th, 2007 at 4:09 pm Quote
#39-41 … I agree with that in the abstract Sandy. Your usual rock-solid analysis.
OTOH, in the abstract, we would not expect Felix to run a high DER and a high tater rate, correct? :- )
The dude throws 9 great pitches and then he gives them the teeball they are waiting for. And over the last two years as a whole, once they do connect with the ball, they definitely do a lot with it.
Given that Felix himself is a gigantic exception to the rule that you accurately pointed out, it’s open to question IMHO whether the phenomenon is staffwide…
‘Staffwide’ meaning that it could apply to (say) 2-3 other starters and a couple of relievers. If it did, that would account for the syndrome.
November 20th, 2007 at 5:44 pm Quote
Batista gets hit hard when he gets hit. So does Washburn. So does JJ Putz (he just doesn’t get hit much) and so do O’Flaherty and Rowland-Smith. I think the Mariners’ pitching staff breaks the mold…they don’t give up HRs…they just give up lots of HAAAARRD ground balls and liners.
November 20th, 2007 at 5:49 pm Quote
Ya, good specifics there…
And we as sabermetricians have not touched … to my knowledge … Billy’s question.
What if a ballclub *were* lousy in terms of locating the ball low-away when the defense was leaning that way?
Why couldn’t one ballclub be better than another, at throwing the pitch that the fielders expect? … :- )
…………………
Obviously some staffs throw with better command than other staffs do. And it’s only good baseball for the defense to have the information as to what pitch is coming. We probably shouldn’t assume that the effect of this factor is zero.
But, of course, it could turn out that the effect is near zero. Sandy’s correlation K’s :: DER is suggestive towards that conclusion.
November 20th, 2007 at 9:17 pm Quote
41- Interesting, perhaps my intstincts have betrayed me on this one. Quick question, though: If the difference between the poorly backed pitcher and the and the well fielded for pitcher is less than 50 outs or so, does the SO pitcher not still operate at an extreme advantage? I could well imagine that these percentages are based on differences of putouts that may be much lower than the 50 out spread between the two. The K heavy pitcher also eliminates “productive outs” (favorite saber whipping boy) which I have learned may not be so productive, but do have a negative effect on the pitcher nonetheless.
Confusing correlation that you have made, Sandy. Not at all what I would have thought. There has to be an accurate measure of a Defender not based entirely on generalized stats, it seems like there are too many variables to consider, and therefore normalize for to have a fair conclusion drawn.
November 20th, 2007 at 9:34 pm Quote
glmuskie-san thanks for remember me at #35.
Sandy-san at #41; your comment supports what I saw about positioning:
SABRMatt-san at #15 ranks Ibanez’s defence between Replacement and Avarage.
But maybe without the false positioning Ibanez=Avarage.
The bad positioning was caused by manager and coaches. (They positioned the outfield per out and runner situation and not to get the best DER against the batter. That is outfield played far 2out and runner on 1st even against slap hitters resulting to bloop hits in front of Ichiro or Ibanez.)
I hope with the new coaches in 2008 that it will change.
BTW Ibanez was the 2nd best player per THT WS with 24. His WSAB was 13. With the market at 1.5 to 2M$ per WSAB he could demand 20M$ in the open FA market. No wonder that many teams want to trade for him.
November 21st, 2007 at 6:59 am Quote
#47 - I am not saying that high-K pitchers aren’t advantaged “overall”. A pitcher who generates 200 outs from Ks compared to one with 100 outs from Ks (in the same inning), is absolutely going to be advantaged “overall” in terms of preventing runs.
My point was to address the suggestion that high Ks or low make the job easier or harder for the gloves. The data says this simply isn’t true.
I also don’t mean to suggest that there is an inherent inverse relation. While Tampa as a team - and the Ms individual pitchers may swing the opposite of expectation, there are plenty of other pitchers that do have high Ks AND good defense. The point is that there is no obvious correlation (big picture) between Ks and DER.
While I agree with the general tenet that high-K pitchers are better than low-K pitchers, Tampa 2007 is the most obvious case around that they are unquestionably NOT a magic bullet answer to run prevention. The very fact that the league leader in team Ks can finish last BY A WIDE MARGIN in runs allowed is (if not proof), at least a very strong suggestion that the GLOVES are actually the more important variable in the equation.
In 2007, Tampa allowed 10.2 hits per game, compared to the league average of 9.4. They allowed the most HRs (199). High Ks, but lots of dingers. THAT is the statistical profile I would expect to see from a team that gets hit hard when they get hit. And Tampa was the only AL team to allow more hits per game than Seattle, btw.
Now, if someone wants to find the Line Drive percentages for all the teams, where there is a numeric comparison to examine, I’ll be happy to entertain the concept that Seattle’s pitchers were a root cause of the DER problems. But I know enough that close observation of ONE team doesn’t give a good view of the whole picture.
My own ’sense’ of the importance split between pitchers and fielders goes very much against the commonly accepted doctrine. My view is simple. In a given season, a team will generate 4400 outs. Of those, about 1100 will be from Ks, and the other 3300 from fielding plays. My basic belief is that fielders are 75% of the defensive equation, and “on the whole”, are more important.
However, the K/rates between INDIVIDUAL pitchers can (and often is), more extreme.
2007 AL average hits per game was 9.4. Best was 8.3 - worst was 10.2. Basically, a plus/minus of 1 hit per game from the average, (which is a little larger than normal, it’s usually closer to 1.5 hits from top to bottom, a .75 hits skew from average.
BUT, individual K-rates can swing from 9/9 to 4/9 at the extremes for starters, (and you can get even more severe skews with relievers. The thing is, a non-K is NOT a hit. It’s a ball-in-play — and roughly 70% of those turn into outs anyway. So, it’s not that every K prevents a hit. It’s that every K prevent (roughly) 30% of a hit.
So, at the extreme ends, the importance of pitchers is extremely obvious, as the elite (or dregs) of pitchers can easily be viewed as consistently above (or below) the rest of the pack. The thing that gets lost is that the closer one gets to the middle, the more important DER becomes. You “average” pitcher’s fate ends up being determined almost exclusively by his walk/HRs and DER behind him - NOT his K-rate.
November 21st, 2007 at 7:18 am Quote
Hm…back in June when the discussions about the Mariners’ defense started, they had a very high LD%…(20.5%), but at the end of the year, they finished at 18.2%…a little better than average. Which is evidence agaisnt the “Seattle pitchers gave up lots of hard hit balls” theory I postulated above.
November 21st, 2007 at 7:45 am Quote
The irony here Matt, is that it was YOUR research into the Voros BIP theory that convinced me that pitcher control over batted balls was in fact so low that “at this time”, we can basically ignore it - ESPECIALLY on the team level.
Much of this simply goes back to the problems associated with visual inspection. The mind remembers “emotionally charged” plays. The line drive is more exciting (or disheartening), than the “routine” single to right-center. The hidden gems are in taking apart those “routine” singles and realizing that what is routine for Seattle ain’t routine for Boston. But one cannot ’sense’ that Toronto’s non-battery gloves get to more BIPs than Seattles, (when you only ever see Toronto bat against Seattle pitching). It’s easier to target the guys you see every day for blame/credit than the guys you see 1/10th of the time. (And correct positioning isn’t likely any more of a constant than BA or ERA. It’s going to fluctuate wildly from series to series, but tell the real story over time, so trying to judge Toronto based on a tenth of a season against one team doesn’t make sense on a multitude of levels.
I believe that your efforts with PCA may have been on the right track. Bases per outs recorded is the foundation block *I* would use for defensive metrics. But I think we’re a long way from getting any concensus on defensive worth because there is still too much dogma attached to the subject. (”Catchers are uber-valuable.” “Pitchers are the main variable in run prevention.”)
November 22nd, 2007 at 1:20 am Quote
I think the main variable in run prevention is the pitcher, but only because the most impactful elements of the game are HR and BB. When it comes to balls in play, it’s a game of luck…like spinning the roulette wheel with 30% odds of failure…some pitchers can cheat a little and the odds of failure go down to 26 or 27%…but for the most part, BIP events are random.
I think you are correct Sandy. I think I am poisoned by the fact that I watch the Mariners 150 times a year and any other team at most 20 times (when they play the Mariners).
November 23rd, 2007 at 6:42 am Quote
When Voros’ theory came out, after I accepted the basic tenet, I became personally enthralled with the idea that the walk was the single most important variable in the equation. It was pretty easy for me to devalue the K based on the inherent understanding that it’s only worth 30% of an out compared to a BIP.
And I still believe that walks are a bigger impact variable than Ks. But, over time, I’ve been moving more toward the position that hits allowed isn’t as random as is believed - and it’s actually more important than generally accepted.
In terms of range from best to worst in the AL in 2007, what do we see.
2007
Strikeouts — 1194 - 976 (218)
BasesonBall - 410 — 696 (286)
Home Runs — 138 — 199 (61)
Base Hits — 1350 - 1649 (299)
2006
Strikeouts — 1164 - 904 (260)
BasesonBall - 356 — 637 (281)
Home Runs — 158 — 216 (58)
Base Hits — 1410 - 1648 (238)
From bottom to top, the range for hits, walks and Ks is actually fairly close at the team level. (I like examining extremes as I believe this is where potential exponential impacts are most easily seen by the naked eye).
So, where did the 2006 and 2007 best and worst RA teams finish in each of these categories?
2006: Detroit (675-RA - 1st)
Strikeouts -: 9th (1003)
BasesonBalls: 5th (489)
Home Runs –: 2nd (160)
Hits allowed: 2nd (1420)
2006: KC (971-RA)
Strikeouts -: 14th (904)
BasesonBalls: 14th (637)
Home Runs –: 13th (213)
Hits allowed: 14th (1648)
2006: Balt (899-RA - 13th)
Strikeouts -: 7th (1016)
BasesonBalls: 13th (613)
Home Runs –: 14th (216)
Hits allowed: 11th (1579)
2006: KC (856-RA - 12th)
Strikeouts -: 11th (979)
BasesonBalls: 12th (606)
Home Runs –: 7th (180)
Hits allowed: 13th (1600)
2007: BOS (657-RA - 1st)
Strikeouts -: 3rd (1149)
BasesonBalls: 5th (482)
Home Runs –: 5th (151)
Hits allowed: 1st (1350)
2007: Tampa (944-RA - 14th)
Strikeouts -: 1st (1194)
BasesonBalls: 11th (568)
Home Runs –: 14th (199)
Hits allowed: 14th (1649)
2007: Balt (868-RA - 13th)
Strikeouts -: 5th (1087)
BasesonBalls: 14th (696)
Home Runs –: 9th (161)
Hits allowed: 5th (1491)
It’s pretty obvious that Ks have the LEAST correlation to success or failure, with a league leader in Ks finishing last in runs allowed, and a 9th place K-team leading the league in fewest runs allowed. It seems that “base runners” is critical, as an excessively high value in EITHER hits or walks can lead to ruin, (Baltimore’s great DER, but horrid control in 2007 - and Texas wasn’t far removed from the same profile).
But, while low walk teams do well, I’m starting to see a pattern where low-HIT teams are even more reliable. Mind you, I haven’t done long term studies - this is very much just skimming season stat pages at BBR, but it’s pretty easy to see.
My sense is that HRs are an accellerator for damage done by base-runners. High HR rates aren’t critical *IF* the Hit+BB numbers are low - but they get progressively more damaging as more men reach base. My growing belief is that DER is “probably” the single biggest factor in run prevention. BUT, it is not a big enough factor where it cannot be overhwelmed by walk rate (to the good or bad).
In 2007, three teams had walk rates below 3.0 - Cleveland, Twinkies and Angels. They finished 3rd, 4th and 5th in runs allowed. The top two teams in runs allowed: Boston and Toronto were each nearly a full hit better than rest of the league, (and also had better than average walk rates). In 2006, there were 4 teams with walk rates under 3.0. They were (runs allowed ranking): Twins (2nd), Angels (3rd), Indians (6th), and WhiteSox (10th).
Ultimately, I believe defensive positioning is more important than athleticism. The key factor being getting pitchers and fielders on the same page. The teams that do a good job of positioning end up better off DER-wise. BUT, they need pitchers who reduce the number of times they ‘cross up’ the defense.
But, since defensive metrics lag so far behind offensive ones, defensive ratings and scouting and assessments remain mired in the goo of 19th century perceptions. BJ Upton is given 4 million chances to ‘learn’ shortstop because he just LOOKS so darned good when he’s making a play - (which was more important than his actual countable - errors - at least for awhile).
I think what gets me the most is the ability to ignore data contrary to a popularly held belief. There is a belief that Ibanez was a MASSIVE detriment to the team defense.
However, about every metric around, (and supported by visual assessments), say that Manny Ramirez would be much worse. Yet, Boston led the entire AL in runs allowed, and easily led in fewest hits allowed. Okay, their pitching had 129 more Ks than Seattles, but Boston allowed 1350 hits, while Seattle allowed 1578 - 228 extra hits.
If Ibanez is judged to be in the same dreadful class as Manny defensively, then that means the REST of the defense has to majorly worse than Boston’s. Even after adjusting for the superior K-rate, Seattle ends up with roughly 1 extra hit falling per game, while playing in a pitcher’s park.
November 23rd, 2007 at 3:20 pm Quote
Safeco isn’t that much of a pitcher’s park for balls in play. The large dimennsionstend to make corner outfielders look bad and center fielders look good but neither outfield position is particularly effected by the park. Safeco is a pitcher’s park because it suppresses HR by right handed hitters.